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INTRODUCTION 
The first thirty days of the Trump administration evoked a 
contentious debate about the rights of noncitizens.  Can the President 
suspend the entry of Iraqi, Iranian, Libyan, Somalian, Sudanese, 
Syrian, and Yemeni citizens?1  Can Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) officers deport a Deferred Action of Childhood 
Arrivals recipient?2  Does an unauthorized migrant have the right to a 
protective order against an abuser without running the risk of being 
deported?3  Should it matter if these individuals speak English, 
understand United States civics, or know how to enroll their child in 
elementary school?  These and other questions about noncitizens’ 
rights and what criteria should be used to determine noncitizens’ rights 
are becoming a growing part of public discourse in the United States 
and in Europe. 
Citizenship scholars actively engage these questions and a number 
of theories have been offered about how liberal democracies should 
distribute rights.  This article focuses on postnational citizenship, 
global citizenship, and transnational citizenship theories.4  These 
theories make specific normative and descriptive claims about the 
availability of citizenship rights.  The normative claim is that 
citizenship rights should be available to noncitizens based on their 
personhood and presence within a territory.5  The descriptive claim is 
that pursuant to the growth of the international human rights regime 
citizenship rights are now available based on personhood rather than 
national cultural belonging.6  Some of these scholars decry the 
1. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-02-01/pdf/2017-02281.pdf.  
2. See Emily Goldberg, What Immigration Raids Mean for Students, THE ATLANTIC
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/02/why-was-a-daca-
recipient-detained-by-ice/517134/.  
3. See Richard Gonzales, ICE Detains Alleged Victim Of Domestic Abuse At Texas
Courthouse, NPR, (Feb. 16, 2017, 10:33 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/02/16/515685385/ice-detains-a-victim-of-domestic-abuse-at-texas-courthouse.  
4. See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
447, 449 (2000). 
5. See, e.g., JOSEPH H. CARENS, IMMIGRANTS AND THE RIGHT TO STAY (2010);
RAINER BABCÖCK, TRANSNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP (1994); Joseph H. Carens, Citizenship 
and Civil Society: What Rights for Residents?, in DUAL NAT’LITY, SOC. RIGHTS AND FED. 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE: THE REINVENTION OF CITIZENSHIP, 101-02 (Randal 
Hansen & Patrick Weil eds., 2002) [hereinafter DUAL NAT’LITY]; Saskia Sassen, The 
Repositioning of Citizenship: Emergent Subjects and Spaces for Politics, 46 BERKLEY J. 
SOC. 4, 6 (2002); Saskia Sassen, The Need to Distinguish Denationalized and Postnational, 
7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 575 (2000). 
6. See, e.g., PETER SCHUCK & ROGERS SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT:
ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985); YASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, LIMITS 
OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE 1 (1994); DAVID 
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diminishing role of the State in allocating and protecting citizenship 
rights,7 others applaud the development as a tool for ensuring that 
noncitizens have the rights that facilitate their economic, political, and 
social integration,8 and some contend that postnational citizenship is 
“partial, insubstantial, and insecure.”9 
This article builds upon the critique that postnational citizenship is 
incomplete by arguing that despite the increasing number of rights 
made available to noncitizens based personhood and residence, three 
categories of rights that are critical for immigrant integration continue 
to have a national cultural belonging prerequisite: (1) immigration-
related rights; (2) economic rights; and (3) political participation rights. 
Noncitizens’ access to these rights is conditioned on demonstrating 
cultural belonging in the form of civic integration.  Citizenship scholars 
have noted that the postnational citizenship model is incomplete 
because it mainly addresses social rights, or that the rights provided by 
the international human rights regime are not self-executing.10  Less 
attention has been given to determining whether or not postnational 
citizenship grants noncitizens the rights that enable them to fully 
develop and benefit from their human capital.  To facilitate this 
analysis, this article offers a new citizenship rights typology in which 
JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS: IMMIGRATION AND THE DECLINE OF CITIZENSHIP 
vii, 2-3 (1997); LAYTON-HENRY HAMMAR, THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF MIGRANT 
WORKERS IN WESTERN EUROPE (1990); Miriam Feldblum, “Citizenship Matters”: 
Contemporary Trends In Europe and the United States, 5 STAN. HUMAN. REV. 97, 107 
(1997); Peter Schuck, The Re-Evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 
30 (1997); Culture as used in this article refers to values, norms, and practices. Adopting the 
sociological understanding of values and norms, values as used in this project refer to 
“abstract ideals” and norms refer to “principles and rules of social life that people are 
expected to observe.” ANTHONY GIDDENS ET. AL., INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY 54 
(2012).  
7. See, e.g., SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 6; JACOBSON, supra note 6; Christian
Joppke, The Inevitable Lightening of Citizenship, 51 EUR. J.  SOC. 9 (2010) (discussing the 
“decreasing subjective value” of citizenship in Western states).  
8. See SOYSAL, supra note 6; CARENS, supra note 5; Carens, supra note 5; Schuck,
supra note 6, at 30.  
9. Michael Jones Correa, Seeking Shelter: Immigrants and the Divergence of Social
Rights and Citizenship in the United States, in DUAL NAT’LITY, supra note 5, at 236; see 
also AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL 
INEQUALITY 62-63 (2009); Schuck, supra note 6, at 30-33; see Jaya Ramji-Nogales, “The 
Right to Have Rights”: Undocumented Migrants and State Protection, 63 KAN. L. REV. 
1045 (2015); Randall Hansen, The Poverty of Postnationalism: Citizenship, Immigration, 
and the New Europe, 38 THEORY & SOC. 1, 12 (2009); Cecilia Menjívar, Liminal Legality: 
Salvadoran and Guatemalan Immigrants’ Lives in the United States, 111 AM. J. SOC. 999, 
1005 (2006).  
10. See Correa, supra note 9, at 235-36; Bosniak, supra note 4, at 467-68 (noting
that international human rights “are made available to individuals only by way of their 
states, which must have affirmatively assumed obligations to enforce them under the various 
human rights treaties”). 
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citizenship rights are divided into human rights, resident rights, and 
membership rights.  Use of this typology demonstrates that the 
postnational citizenship model only accounts for one of the three types 
of rights commonly thought of as citizenship rights.  The citizenship 
rights typology offered and an analysis of noncitizens’ rights within 
European Union member states illustrates that national cultural 
belonging, rather than personhood, continues to be the basis upon 
which critical citizenship rights are made available to noncitizens. 
Immigrants’ access to citizenship rights is important for at least 
two reasons.  First, it determines the manner in which the State can 
interact with immigrants.  For example, are noncitizens entitled to due 
process when being deported?  Can lawful permanent residents 
returning to the United States be denied entry because of their 
nationality or religion?  Citizens cannot be deported or denied entry 
into their country of nationality, but does the State have greater 
authority over noncitizens?  The second reason immigrants’ access to 
citizenship rights matters is because access to legal rights shapes 
immigrant incorporation patterns.  Immigrant integration or 
incorporation occurs when noncitizens’ participation in society is 
indistinguishable from the participation of native-born citizens.11  For 
example, integration has occurred when the difference in educational 
attainment, language skills, access to healthcare, or the employment 
rates between citizens and noncitizens is imperceptible.  Social 
scientists have empirically demonstrated and theoretically explained 
that immigrants’ incorporation patterns are shaped by immigrants’ 
“individual characteristics [and] motivations” and their context of 
reception.12  Immigrants’ context of reception, which includes 
government policy and legal rights, determines whether or not 
immigrants’ individual human capital—language skills, education, and 
11. ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT
13, 232–41 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA]; 
RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM: ASSIMILATION 
AND CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION 5–6, 11–12 (2003); ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. 
RUMBAUT, LEGACIES: THE STORY OF THE IMMIGRANT SECOND GENERATION 46–48 
(2001) [hereinafter PORTES & RUMBAUT, LEGACIES]; Angela M. Banks, The Curious 
Relationship Between “Self-Deportation” Policies and Naturalization Rates, 16 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1149, 1159 (2012) “Immigrant incorporation is achieved when immigrants 
are integrated into U.S. society such that it is difficult to differentiate their legal protections, 
access to public resources, educational outcomes, language skills, and job opportunities 
from those of native-born citizens.”  Throughout this article the terms integration and 
incorporation are used interchangeably.   
12. HELEN B. MARROW, NEW DESTINATION DREAMING: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND
LEGAL STATUS IN THE RURAL AMERICAN SOUTH 9 (2011). An immigrants’ context of 
reception is the “structural and institutional features of the specific contexts that immigrants 
enter,” which “influence their experiences and opportunities for mobility.”    
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job skills—can be put to its best use. 
While the postnational citizenship model is incomplete, it has 
made an important contribution to the study of citizenship in the 
twenty-first century.  This body of scholarship highlights the important 
ways in which citizenship rights are disaggregated and decoupled from 
citizenship status.13  This reality demonstrates that citizenship status is 
not the exclusive vehicle for granting citizenship rights, and that it is 
possible to grant noncitizens citizenship rights that would facilitate 
integration and social cohesion.  An accurate understanding of 
noncitizens’ citizenship rights is necessary to determine which rights 
are outstanding, whether or not such rights alter an immigrant’s context 
of reception, and whether or not such rights should be available based 
on personhood, lawful residence, or membership.  This article is the 
first in a series of articles that undertakes this analysis to ascertain how 
best to ensure immigrant integration and better facilitate economic and 
social cohesion. 
This article proceeds in four parts.  Part I of the article introduces 
the human-resident-membership rights typology to facilitate a more 
precise examination of the claims made by postnational citizenship 
scholars.  Disaggregating the rights that these scholars refer to as 
citizenship rights allows one to better analyze which rights are 
available based on universal personhood and which continue to be 
uniquely available to individuals who can demonstrate national cultural 
belonging.  Part II introduces postnational citizenship, and 
demonstrates that the citizenship rights available to noncitizens within 
this model are human rights rather than resident rights or membership 
rights. Part III identifies how the key rights for immigrant 
incorporation—the right to enter and reside, the right to remain, 
economic activity rights, political participation rights, and education 
rights—are allocated within the European Union (“EU”).  The article 
focuses on the EU because many of the descriptive claims made by 
postnational citizenship scholars are based on noncitizens’ rights within 
the EU.  The rights typology offered in Part II clarifies which of these 
rights are human rights, resident rights, or membership rights.  The 
analysis provided in Part III illustrates the limitations of the 
postnational citizenship model.  Finally, Part IV contends that 
membership within a polity continues to be measured in terms of 
national cultural belonging.  Therefore, access to the membership 
13. See ELIZABETH F. COHEN, SEMI-CITIZENSHIP IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS 6 (2009);
SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 1 (2004); 
Rose Cuison Villazor, Interstitial Citizenship,  FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 1676, 1678-79) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=2772766).   
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category of citizenship rights is only available to individuals who are 
able to demonstrate civic integration.  This significantly limits 
noncitizens’ ability to fully develop and utilize their human capital. 
I. CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS
This article focuses on the role of immigration-related rights, 
economic activity rights, political participation rights, and education 
rights because these rights play a critical role in the immigrant 
incorporation process.  Some of these rights are uniquely available to 
citizens, others are available based on personhood, and a final group 
are available based on lawful residence.  This Part introduces the 
human-resident-membership rights typology to facilitate a more precise 
examination of the claims made by postnational citizenship scholars. 
By disaggregating the rights addressed in the postnational citizenship 
model, it is possible to determine which rights are available based on 
universal personhood and which continue to be uniquely available to 
individuals who can demonstrate national cultural belonging.  The 
second section of this Part examines how States can allocate citizenship 
rights to individuals without citizenship status. 
A. Rights Typology
Within the citizenship literature there is no agreed upon definition
of citizenship rights.  Scholars, advocates, and government officials use 
the term to refer to a wide range of rights.14  For example, the right to 
enter, reside, and remain in a State’s territory, voting rights, the right to 
serve on a jury, the right to bear arms, the right to family life, freedom 
of assembly and association, and freedom of movement have all been 
characterized as citizenship rights.15  Yet access to these rights varies 
significantly.  Some are only available to individuals with citizenship 
status, others are available to those who are lawfully present within the 
14. See Correa, supra note 9, at 235-36 (“Rights for non-citizen residents are rarely part
of a nation-state’s core laws, its constitution.  Because of this, I would argue, they do not 
deserve to be called citizenship rights.”). T.H. Marshall’s classic account of citizenship 
rights focuses on the substance of the rights provided rather than the categories of 
individuals who benefit from the rights.  Marshall’s typology divides citizenship rights into 
civil, political, and social rights. T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 10 
(1950).  The citizenship rights typology offered in this article builds on Marshall’s insights 
but recognizes that noncitizens currently have civil and political rights despite lacking 
citizenship status.  
15. See, e.g., SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 122; see Villazor, supra note 13, at 1712; see
also Correa, supra note 9, at 235 (“Postnational citizenship theorists think of citizenship as a 
set of rights that are extended like an umbrella over permanent residents (whomever they 
may be in the polity.”).  
2017] BRINGING CULTURE BACK 321
society, and others still are available to all who are present.  This article 
offers a citizenship rights typology to clarify which rights are available 
to noncitizens and based on what criteria.  Distinguishing between 
human rights, resident rights, and citizenship rights provides a basis for 
conducting a more nuanced analysis of postnational citizenship.  This 
rights typology makes visible the disaggregation of citizenship rights 
and the decoupling of these rights from citizenship status.  The 
typology also illustrates that national cultural belonging, rather than 
personhood, continues to be the basis upon which some rights 
traditionally viewed as citizenship rights are allocated. 
Within citizenship-related discourse the term citizenship is used in 
a variety of different ways. Legal scholar Linda Bosniak developed a 
useful typology for differentiating the various ways in which the term 
citizenship is used.16  Citizenship can refer to a legal status, identity, 
legal rights, or political engagement.17  Bosniak’s typology offers a tool 
for greater clarity and more insightful critiques in citizenship discourse. 
Just as citizenship is used in different ways so is citizenship rights. 
Some discussions about citizenship rights focus on the rights that all 
individuals within a particular territory have while others focus on the 
rights that are uniquely available to individuals with citizenship 
status.18  The citizenship rights typology offered here provides better 
clarity about the types of rights that scholars are referring to when 
discussing citizenship rights.  Such clarity is necessary for properly 
determining how citizenship rights are allocated and understanding 
why certain rights are available to noncitizens. 
The term citizenship rights refers to rights that are best understood 
as human rights, resident rights, and membership rights.  Human rights 
are rights that are available to every individual by virtue of being 
human.  These rights ensure that the inherent dignity of all people is 
recognized and protected by the State.19  Resident rights are rights that 
are available to individuals who are lawfully present within a State’s 
territory.  These rights facilitate non-members’ economic and social 
participation, but they are granted in ways that protect full members’ 
economic and social rights.  Membership rights are rights that facilitate 
the fullest participation—economic, social, and political—of 
individuals deemed members of the society.  It is my contention that 
16. Bosniak, supra note 4, at 456-89.
17. Id.
18. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY 
MEMBERSHIP 31-34 (2008). 
19. U.N. GAOR, UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Dec. 10, 1948), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf. 
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membership is reserved for those individuals who have the most robust 
cultural connection to the State.  The legal status of citizen conveys full 
membership within a State, and national cultural belonging is an 
explicit or implicit requirement for citizenship status.  For those 
individuals that become citizens via naturalization, cultural belonging 
is explicitly tested during the naturalization process.  For those who are 
citizens by virtue of birth within the country or birth to parents who are 
citizens it is assumed that their socialization process will ensure 
national cultural belonging.  As will be evident in Parts III and IV, 
noncitizen’s access to immigration-related economic activity and 
political participation rights become more robust with increasing levels 
of national cultural belonging. 
Human rights, resident rights, and membership rights can be 
thought of as concentric circles with membership rights in the inner-
most ring, resident rights in the middle ring, and human rights in the 
outer-most ring.20 
Figure 1 
Within a given State everyone physically present will have human 
rights, those lawfully present will have resident rights and human 
rights, and members will have membership rights, resident rights, and 
human rights.  The robustness of the resident and membership rights 
20. See T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
MARYELLEN FULLERTON & JULIET P. STUMPF, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS 
AND POLICY 49 (2016).  
2017] BRINGING CULTURE BACK 323
will depend on the purpose of residence and length of residence, which 
often correlate with immigration and citizenship statuses.  For example, 
long-term residents or lawful permanent residents have a more robust 
right to enter their state of residence than first-time arriving foreign 
students.21  While both individuals are lawfully present residents, they 
were admitted based on different connections to the State, and the 
difference in connections allows the long-term resident to be viewed as 
more of a member than the student. Citizens, on the other hand, have 
an absolute right to enter their country of residence while long-term 
residents merely have a robust, but not absolute, right to enter their 
state of residence.  Citizens are deemed to have greater connections to 
the State than long-term residents, which entitles citizens to a more 
robust membership status, and greater protection of membership rights. 
As basic rights that protect the inherent dignity of all humans, 
human rights include rights such as the right to life, liberty, security of 
person, criminal procedure rights, freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, freedom of expression, and freedom from discrimination.22  
Resident rights include the right to work and engage in other economic 
activity in accordance with the rules governing one’s immigration 
status, local political participation rights, and access social welfare 
benefits.23  Finally, membership rights, include an absolute right to 
enter, reside, and remain in one’s country of citizenship, the right to 
vote in national elections, run for public office, support political 
campaigns, and a fairly absolute right to work.24 
The postnational citizenship claim that citizenship rights are 
available based on personhood focuses on the availability of human 
21. The terms “long-term resident” and “lawful permanent resident” are immigration
statuses that grant noncitizens robust rights in their country of residence.  Long-term 
resident status is given in EU member states, and lawful permanent resident status is given 
in the United States.  Both of these statuses are available to noncitizens based on their 
family connections to the state or their proposed economic activity in the state of residence.  
Since the relevant status in EU member states is long-term resident, this article will utilize 
this terminology. 
22. The right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of nationality does not extend
to immigration-related rights such as the right to enter and remain.  Courts have 
continuously held that States have the sovereign right to determine which noncitizens can 
enter the country.  See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606-07, 609 
(1889).   
23. See, e.g., Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 45, O.J. C 224/1, at 122
(1992) [hereinafter EU Treaty]; Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the on 
the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly 
qualified employment, May 25, 2009, O.J. (L 155/17) art. 12(3) (2009) [hereinafter EC 
Council Directive]. This is a nonexhaustive list of resident rights. 
24.  See, e.g., EU Treaty, supra note 23.  This is a nonexhaustive list of membership
rights. 
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rights.  While these rights have historically been limited to individuals 
with citizenship status, this category of rights are now available to all 
based on personhood.25  Yet, there are two additional categories of 
citizenship rights that are not available based on personhood—resident 
rights and membership rights. 
B. Unbundling & Decoupling Citizenship Rights
The idea that noncitizens could be the beneficiaries of citizenship
rights may sound counterintuitive.  Yet the citizenship rights typology 
introduced in the preceding section clarifies that when scholars, 
government officials, and civil society actors speak about citizenship 
rights they are often referring to human rights, resident rights, or 
membership rights.  The umbrella term “citizenship rights” reflects 
different understandings and purposes of citizenship.  For example, 
Bosniak’s work on the “citizenship of aliens” responds to the 
differentiation between “citizenship within the community” and 
“citizenship at the border.”26  There is a universalist approach to 
“citizenship within the community” in which the goal is the “inclusion 
and participation of everyone.”27  Simultaneously there is an 
exclusionary or particularist approach to “citizenship at the border” in 
which the focus is defining the boundaries of the community.  In this 
context, the goal is not universal inclusion, but rather restricting 
membership, which is frequently viewed as “an essential part of a 
community’s process of self-definition.”28  This dual approach to 
citizenship helps to explain why noncitizens would have certain 
citizenship rights, like human rights and resident rights, when they are 
physically present within a country.29  However, the “citizenship at the 
border” approach to legal rights would make membership rights 
uniquely available to individuals with citizenship status.  An example 
would be granting citizens and physically-present noncitizens different 
immigration-related rights.  Differentiating between “citizenship within 
the community” and “citizenship at the border” provides a basis for 
understanding how and why human rights, resident rights, and 
membership rights can all be considered citizenship rights, and how 
25.  See, e.g., Bosniak, supra note 18, at 34.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 29 (quoting Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of
the Idea of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 250-51 (1989)). 
28. Id. at 33.
29. Rights like due process and equal protection are granted to all individuals within
the community and noncitizens’ physical presence entitles them to human rights and 
resident rights.   
2017] BRINGING CULTURE BACK 325
they get allocated differently amongst citizens and noncitizens. 
The citizenship rights typology introduced in Part I(A) 
exemplifies the unbundling of citizenship rights.  Rather than viewing 
citizenship rights as a tight bundle of rights that are distributed as a 
unit, it is more accurate to view them as fundamental civil, political, 
economic, and social rights that are “independent of, rather than 
contingent upon, each other.”30  This creates a divisible bundle of rights 
that can be allocated in numerous combinations.31 
Conceptualizing citizenship rights as a disaggregated group of 
rights allows for a more complete and nuanced analysis of the 
allocation of citizenship rights.  This approach to citizenship rights is 
explored by legal scholars Linda Bosniak and Rose Cuison Villazor, 
and political scientist Elizabeth Cohen.  Bosniak’s work on the 
“citizenship of aliens” illustrates that noncitizens in most liberal 
democratic societies “are routinely entitled to a broad range of 
important civil and social rights—rights that are commonly described 
in the language of citizenship.”32  These rights include “full due 
process rights in criminal proceedings, . . . expressive, associational, 
and religious freedom rights, . . . the protections of the state’s labor and 
employment laws, and to the right to education and other social 
benefits.”33  Akin to the arguments made by postnational scholars, 
Bosniak notes that these rights are available to noncitizens based on 
their territorial presence and personhood.34  These are human rights 
within the human-resident-membership rights typology.  Yet unlike 
most postnational scholars, Bosniak explicitly acknowledges that 
territorial presence and personhood do not give rise to immigration-
related rights.35  Bosniak implicitly differentiates between human rights 
and membership rights when she explains that noncitizens “always 
remain subject to potential deportation.”36 
Villazor’s work on “interstitial citizenship” similarly illustrates 
that individuals without citizenship status enjoy some citizenship 
rights.37  Villazor’s work focuses on the rights of American nationals. 
30. Villazor, supra note 13, at 1720-21; see also COHEN, supra note 13, at 6 (“an
intertwining set or ‘braid’ of fundamental civil, political, and social rights, along with rights 
of nationality.”). 
31. See COHEN, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that “[n]umerous configurations are
conceivable”); BENHABIB, supra note 13, at 1. 
32. Bosniak, supra note 18, at 34.
33. Id. 
34. BOSNIAK, supra note 4, at 459. 
35. Bosniak, supra note 18, at 34.
36. Id. 
37. See Villazor, supra note 13.
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National is a legal status that is distinct from citizen and alien, and 
nationals have citizenship rights that are not the same as either citizens 
or aliens.  For example, like citizens, federal immigration law does not 
apply to nationals because they are not aliens, but like aliens, nationals 
are not eligible to vote in federal, state, or local elections because they 
are not citizens.38  By analyzing the rights of American nationals 
Villazor demonstrates that “citizenship rights may be disentangled 
from formal citizenship and that citizenship is far more fluid and 
malleable than its conventional framing suggests.”39  In describing 
nationals as interstitial citizens Villazor illustrates that citizenship 
rights are in fact a bundle of rights that can be disaggregated.40 
Cohen’s work on semi-citizenship not only demonstrates that 
citizenship rights can be, and often are, disaggregated and decoupled 
from citizenship status, but she also explains why this happens.  Cohen 
explains that “because rights create political relationships it is crucial to 
states that they be able to disaggregate bundles of rights.”41  
Disaggregating citizenship rights allows states to shape and manage 
“populations whose diverse elements could not all be governed by a 
single set of rules.”42  Membership status is one way of organizing the 
population that accounts for relevant diverse elements.  Disaggregating 
citizenship rights gives rise to what Cohen terms, semi-citizenship.43  
Semi-citizens are individuals who are only accorded a subset of the 
fundamental civil, political, and social rights granted to citizens.44  It is 
possible to disaggregate citizenship rights because they are “an 
intertwining set or ‘braid’ of fundamental civil, political, and social 
rights, along with rights of nationality.”45  These rights not only 
become unbraided from each other, but each individual strand can fray. 
Types of citizenship rights can become disaggregated from one another 
and from their constituent parts.  This suggests that citizenship rights 
are independent of, rather than contingent upon, each other; that is, 
each right exists because it is valuable in itself, not become it makes 
the exercise of other rights possible.46 
Cohen’s state-centric approach to explaining the existence of 
disaggregated citizenship rights provides a basis for understanding the 
38. Id. at 1675-76.
39. Id. at 1678-79.
40. Id. at 1679.
41. COHEN, supra note 13, at 6. 
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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development of citizenship rights for noncitizens in the European 
Union.  The desire to facilitate immigrant incorporation and the belief 
that secure legal rights enable immigrants to achieve the same 
economic and social outcomes as citizens would lead states to grant 
immigrants citizenship rights.  However, states may still want to 
differentiate between individuals with different levels of connection or 
commitment to the state and grant these groups different combinations 
of rights.  The European Union approach to noncitizen rights reflects a 
disaggregated approach in which rights are varied based on perceived 
commitment and connection to the state. 
Bosniak’s, Villazor’s, and Cohen’s work theoretically explain and 
empirically demonstrate the disaggregation of citizenship rights and the 
decoupling of these rights from citizenship status.  The remaining parts 
of this article build on these theoretical insights to analyze the creation 
of a new citizenship rights regime to facilitate immigrant incorporation 
in the European Union.  Contrary to the empirical claims made by 
postnational scholars, it is my contention that postnational citizenship 
only exists with regard to “citizenship within the community,” it has no 
bearing on “citizenship at the border.”  Noncitizens are granted human 
rights within the postnational citizenship model, but immigration-
related rights continue to be membership rights that are coupled with 
citizenship status.  While such rights are not as tightly coupled to 
citizenship status as they are in the United States, postnational 
citizenship scholars fail to acknowledge that access to these rights 
continues to be dependent upon national cultural belonging, which does 
little to alter noncitizens’ access to membership rights. 
II. POSTNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP
Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal’s groundbreaking 1994 book, LIMITS OF 
CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN 
EUROPE, argued that noncitizens within Europe had a variety of 
citizenship rights despite their lack of citizenship status.  Soysal named 
this new development postnational citizenship because citizenship 
rights were available “based on universal personhood rather than 
national belonging.”47  Soysal argues that this “new and more universal 
concept of citizenship” unfolded in the post-war era.48  A defining 
feature of this new citizenship model is that rights that were previously 
47. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 1 (the traditional model national citizenship is “anchored
in territorialized notions of cultural belonging”); see also JACOBSON, supra note 6, at vii, 2-
3.  
48. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 1.
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exclusively available to citizens are now available to noncitizens 
through the rubric of personal rights or human rights.49  Soysal uses the 
post-World War II experience of guestworkers in European countries 
to demonstrate that noncitizens have experienced social, political, and 
economic incorporation in their states of residence.50  Guestworkers’ 
social, political, and economic participation in their countries of 
residence defies traditional understandings about distinctions drawn 
between citizens and noncitizens.  Soysal notes that guestworkers 
“participate in the educational system, welfare schemes, and labor 
markets” and they “join trade unions, take part in politics through 
collective bargaining and associational activity, and sometimes vote in 
local elections.”51 
The traditional model of citizenship—national citizenship—is 
described as being “anchored in territorialized notions of cultural 
belonging.”52  Soysal describes this approach to citizenship as defining 
“bounded populations, with a specific set of rights and duties, 
excluding ‘others’ on the grounds of nationality.”53  Pursuant to this 
citizenship model immigrants had to become national citizens before 
they would have the bundle of rights exclusively available to citizens.54  
The experience of guestworkers, however, demonstrates that 
noncitizens have a variety of rights within their states of residence 
despite lacking citizenship status.55  This new model of citizenship—
postnational citizenship—makes rights previously exclusively available 
to national citizens available based on personhood.  Soysal explains 
that postnational citizenship “confers upon every person the right and 
duty of participation in the authority structures and public life of a 
polity, regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that 
community.”56 
Soysal correctly contends that “individual rights, historically 
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1-2. Throughout this article the terms integration and incorporation are used
interchangeably to refer to the participation of noncitizens in the society of residence in 
manner that is indistinguishable from native-born citizens.  PORTES & RUMBAUT, 
IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 11, at 13, 232–41; ALBA & NEE, supra note 11, at 5–6, 
11–13 (2003); PORTES & RUMBAUT, LEGACIES, supra note 11, at 46–48 (2001); Banks, 
supra note 11 (“Immigrant incorporation is achieved when immigrants are integrated into 
U.S. society such that it is difficult to differentiate their legal protections, access to public 
resources, educational outcomes, language skills, and job opportunities from those of native-
born citizens.”). 
51. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 2.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id. at 3 (“immigrants were expected to be molded into national citizens”).
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id. at 3.
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defined on the basis of nationality, are increasingly codified into a 
different scheme that emphasizes universal personhood.”57  Yet the 
rights that noncitizens have by virtue of their personhood are limited. 
Access to two additional categories of rights, resident rights and 
membership rights, remain contingent on factors other than 
personhood.  For example, Soysal’s discussion of entry and residence 
exclaims that “[b]y the 1980s, well over half the foreigners in Europe 
already had permanent residency in their host countries—a virtually 
irrevocable status carrying with it varying rights and privileges of 
membership.”58  Yet this immigration status, and the corresponding 
rights, is not available based on personhood.  It is available based on 
lawful residence in the state, and post-2000 it is conditioned on 
demonstrating civic integration.  A similar situation exists for the 
social, economic, and political rights Soysal discusses.  She notes that 
for social rights it is legal status and physical presence that are “the 
most important factors” in determining rights.59  Economic activity 
rights are similarly based on immigration status.  Soysal explains that 
immigration status categories “impose the principal constraints on 
migrants’ exercise of economic rights.  They determine the scope of 
noncitizens’ engagement in professions and trades and their access to 
labor markets.”60  Soysal concludes by noting that “once migrants are 
in and established as legal permanent residents, they are entitled to take 
up any gainful activity.”61  Soysal tends to focus on the rights of legal 
permanent residents to demonstrate that citizenship status is not 
dispositive in determining an individual’s rights.  Yet legal permanent 
resident status is not available based on personhood, and it is 
increasingly only available to individuals who can demonstrate national 
cultural belonging.62  Thus immigrants’ access to citizenship looks 
more like the traditional citizenship model than the postnational 
citizenship model Soysal introduces. 
III. RIGHTS AND INCORPORATION
Immigrant incorporation is the process by which immigrants are 
incorporated into the host society “such that it is difficult to 
differentiate their legal protections, access to public resources, 
educational outcomes, language skills, and job opportunities from those 
57. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 136. 
58. Id. at 122.
59. Id. at 124.
60. Id. at 126.
61. Id. at 126.
62. See infra Part IV.
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of native-born citizens.”63  Naturalization is often viewed as an 
important part of the immigrant incorporation process because it can be 
the basis for obtaining rights that facilitate equitable access to public 
resources employment, or educational outcomes.  Alternatively, 
naturalization can mark the culmination of the incorporation process. 
For postnational citizenship scholars, naturalization is not a 
critical part of the incorporation process.  Migrants have access to 
citizenship rights, rights that facilitate incorporation, based on their 
personhood rather than their citizenship status.  Citizenship rights are 
important for immigrant incorporation because legal rights are part of 
the context of reception that immigrants encounter.  An immigrants’ 
context of reception is the “structural and institutional features of the 
specific contexts that immigrants enter,” which “influence their 
experiences and opportunities for mobility.”64  Social scientists have 
examined four distinct dimensions of immigrants’ context of 
reception—government policy, labor market conditions, existing ethnic 
or national communities, and reactions from the native population.65  
These aspects of an immigrants’ context of reception shape the 
“framework of economic opportunities and legal options available to 
migrants once they arrive.”66  Postnational citizenship scholars contend 
that legal rights play a critically important role in immigrant 
incorporation.  Law determines who can be admitted to a state, a 
migrant’s legal status within the host state, and the migrant’s “access to 
social and economic resources.”67  Sociologists Alejandro Portes and 
Rubén G. Rumbaut explain that law is “the first stage of the process of 
incorporation because it affects the probability of successful 
immigration and the framework of economic opportunities and legal 
options available to migrants once they arrive.”68 
Many postnational citizenship scholars are excited about a 
membership model in which rights “previously defined as national 
rights become entitlements legitimized on the basis of personhood.”69  
Soysal explains that “[p]ostnational citizenship confers upon every 
63. Banks, supra note 11, at 1159; see also ALBA & NEE, supra note 11, at 11–13;
PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 11, at 13, 232–41; PORTES & 
RUMBAUT, LEGACIES, supra note 11, at 46–48. 
64. MARROW, supra note 12, at 9. Immigrant incorporation is also shaped by
immigrants’ “individual characteristics [and] motivations.” 
65. Banks, supra note 11, at 1169 (citing Marrow, supra note 12, at 233; PORTES &
RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 11, at 92-93).  
66. PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 11, at 93.
67. Banks, supra note 11, at 1171.
68. PORTES & RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 11, at 93.
69. See, e.g., SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 3.
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person the right and duty of participation in authority structures and 
public life of a polity regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that 
community.”70  Such a model of membership would support immigrant 
incorporation by ensuring immigrants equal access to economic and 
social resources, providing confidence that immigrants will be able to 
remain in their state of residence to reap the benefits of their material 
and non-material investments in their state of residence, and 
guaranteeing the ability of immigrants’ family members to join them so 
that they can enjoy the comfort and support that comes from living 
together as a family.  However, the postnational citizenship model is 
unable to achieve these goals because immigration-related rights, the 
right to work, and political participation rights are not allocated based 
on personhood.  Rather these rights are allocated based on connections 
to the State like residence, family, and culture. 
Before turning to an analysis of five rights that are important for 
immigrant incorporation, the next section explains the unique situation 
of non-European migrants within Europe.  With the creation of 
European Union citizenship in 1992, non-European citizens faced the 
possibility of being excluded from the rights allocated by the European 
Union because they lacked citizenship status in EU member states.71  
This concern led to the enactment of secondary law that allocated 
citizenship rights to non-European migrants.72  This secondary law is 
an important source of rights that postnational citizenship scholars 
point to as evidence of the creation of postnational citizenship.  This 
body of law goes a long way in creating a rights regime in which the 
rights of European citizens and non-European citizens are 
indistinguishable as claimed by postnational citizenship scholars. 
However, in the areas of immigration-related rights, economic rights, 
and political participation rights, the rights of non-European migrants 
are limited, or are conditioned on demonstrating civic integration. 
Returning to Bosniak’s discussion of citizenship, this secondary law 
implements the universalist principle of “citizenship within the 
community,” but not “citizenship at the border.” 
A. Third-Country Nationals
European Union member states faced a challenge regarding the
membership status of first, second, and third generation immigrants 
70. Id.
71. See e.g., Michael A. Becker, Managing Diversity in the European Union: Inclusive
European Citizenship and Third-Country Nationals, 7 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & 
DEVELOPMENT J. 132, 137-38 (2004). 
72. Id.
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who were long-term residents.  A troubling number of these individuals 
did not have citizenship status in their states of residence despite long-
term residence within the country.73  For example, Rogers Brubaker 
noted in his 1992 study of citizenship in Germany and France that 
“nearly half a million second-generation Turkish immigrants, born and 
raised in Germany, remain outside the community of citizens.”74  This 
reflected the sense that citizenship in Germany “refer[e]d to a 
‘community of descent’, with little regard for birthplace and 
residence.”75  Administrative regulations explicitly stated that “the 
Federal Republic is not a country of immigration [and] does not strive 
to increase the number of its citizens through naturalization.”76  
Germany significantly revised its citizenship laws in 2000 and granted 
birthright citizenship to the children of immigrants born within 
Germany if at least one parent has resided in Germany lawfully for at 
least eight years and has a right to permanent residence.77  Despite 
changes in German citizenship law and the law of other European 
Union member states, a significant number of non-European citizens 
residing in the European Union were not citizens of their states of 
residence.78 
The legal status of these individuals, referred to as third-country 
nationals (“TCNs”), within the European Union presented a challenge 
because EU law granted certain rights based on EU citizenship, which 
is only available to the citizens of EU member states.79  Freedom of 
73. Many of these immigrants’ birth within the Member States’ territory did not give
rise to citizenship within that Member State.  See, e.g., Marc Morje´ Howard, The Causes 
and Consequences of Germany’s New Citizenship Law, 17 GERMAN POLITICS 41, 42 
(2008).  Additionally the requirements for naturalization were often significant. For 
example, before 2000 Germany required ten years’ residence and applicants had to renounce 
their prior citizenship. Id. at 61, n. 71.  
74. ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY
75 (1992). 
75.  Howard, supra note 73, at 42.
76.  BRUBAKER, supra note 74, at 77; see also Howard, supra note 73, at 42 (noting
that pre-2000 “German citizenship refer[e]d to a ‘community of descent’, with little regard 
for birthplace and residence”).  
77. Entry & Residence, Law on Nationality, GERMAN FED. FOREIGN OFFICE (last
visited Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/EN/EinreiseUndAufenthalt/04_Recht/Staatsangehoerigkeitsrecht.html.  
78. OECD/European Union, Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In 332
(2015), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/social-issues-
migration-health/indicators-of-immigrant-integration-2015-settling-in_9789264234024-
en#.WW-tv4jyvZs. 
79. When the Treaty on European Union was being considered there were proposals to
grant EU citizenship to third-country nationals, but they were resoundly rejected.  Severine 
Picard, The EU Constitutional Treaty: Towards A European Citizenship For Third Country 
Nationals?, 1 J. CONTEMP. EUR. RESEARCH 73, 74 (2005), 
http://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/viewFile/8/7. 
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movement and other rights meant to facilitate the economic, political, 
and social goals of the EU would not be available to TCNs unless EU 
citizenship rights were extended to TCNs.  Failing to develop a rights 
regime for TCNs was viewed as problematic for at least four reasons. 
First, TCNs made up a significant portion of the population within the 
European Union.  In 1998, 10 million TCNs lawfully resided in EU 
member states.80  While this only accounted for four percent of the total 
EU population, it represented a population larger than a number of EU 
member states.81  Second, it legitimated the unequal treatment of ethnic 
minorities.  Most TCNs are “perceived as belonging to a visible 
minority” because of their family name, mother tongue, religion, and 
skin color.82  Thus, ethnic minorities and TCNs are often one in the 
same within EU member states and the allocation of rights based on 
citizenship status unintentionally limits the rights of ethnic minorities. 
Third, TCNs were long-term residents who were settled within the EU 
and would not be leaving.  Contrary to the perception of many EU 
member states that the States were not countries of immigration, they 
had become just that.  While the large-scale migration that took place 
post-World War II was viewed as temporary for decades, by the 
beginning of the twenty-first century it became impossible to continue 
to view migrants as temporary workers who would return home.  These 
workers had settled in member states and had become a permanent part 
of society.83  Finally, migration would continue such that the TCN 
population will not disappear over time.84 
The Council of the European Union (“the Council”) agreed that 
the incorporation of TCNs who were long-term residents was an 
important issue.  In 1999, the Council concluded “the legal status of 
third-country nationals should be approximated to that of member 
states’ nationals.”85  One approach offered for accomplishing this was 
granting TCNs who reside within a member state for a period of time 
and have a long-term residence permit “a set of uniform rights which 
are as near as possible to those enjoyed by citizens of the European 
Union.”86  This began to come to life in 2004 when the Council enacted 
80. Kees Groenendijk & Elspeth Guild, Converging Criteria: Creating an Area of
Security of Residence for Europe’s Third Country Nationals, 3 EUR. J. MIGRATION L. 37, 39 
(2001). 
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 37.
84. Id. at 40.
85. Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, SN 200/99, sec. 21 (Oct. 15-
16, 1999), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm .  
86. Council Directive (EC) No. 109/2003 of 25 November 2003, art. 4(1), 2003 O.J. (L
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a directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are 
long-term residents.87  This directive explained that the incorporation 
of TCNs who are long-term residents was “a key element in promoting 
economic and social cohesion, a fundamental objective of the 
Community stated in the Treaty.”88  Because of this commitment, 
postnational citizenship scholars correctly identify the development of 
a rights regime that is available to individuals based on something 
other than national citizenship.  Yet this regime is not based solely on 
personhood.  EU member states are increasingly conditioning 
immigration-related rights, economic rights, and political rights on 
civic integration.  Civic integration, like national cultural belonging, 
requires migrants to demonstrate that they have adopted the member 
state’s values, norms, and practices before gaining these rights.89 
The remaining sections of this Part discuss noncitizens’ right to 
enter, reside, remain, vote, work, and be educated in a state in which 
they do not have citizenship status.  This discussion illustrates that 
access to these rights varies based on levels of national cultural 
belonging measured by citizenship and immigration status. 
B. Citizenship Rights in Practice
Citizenship rights are important for immigrant incorporation
because legal rights are part of the context of reception that immigrants 
encounter.  Four key aspects of immigrants’ context of reception are: 
government policy, labor market conditions, existing ethnic or national 
communities, and reactions from the native population.90  The 
following sections examine the rights of TCNs in the areas of 
immigration, employment, political participation, and education.  This 
discussion illustrates that none of these rights, except for education 
rights, are available to noncitizens based on personhood, but rather 
based on national cultural belonging in the form of civic integration. 
1. The Right to Enter & Reside
The right to enter and remain within the territorial borders of a
state are rights that continue to be governed based on traditional 
notions of state sovereignty.  National citizens have an absolute right to 
016) 44, whereas statement 2 (concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents) [hereinafter Long-Term Resident Council Directive].
87. Id.
88. Id. (whereas statement 4).
89. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
90. Banks, supra note 11, at 1169 (citing Marrow, supra note 12, at 233; PORTES &
RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA, supra note 11, at 92-93).  
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enter their country of nationality, to reside there, and they cannot be 
deported.  The ability to enter a state to work or join family, to have 
reasonable expectations about how long you can reside there, and to 
know that only serious criminal activity will lead to deportation creates 
a sense of security for immigrants.  Such security allows immigrants to 
invest material and non-material resources in the country of residence 
that will enable them to achieve economic, social, and political 
incorporation.  In the parlance of the human-resident-membership 
rights typology, the absolute right to enter and remain is a membership 
right, a robust right to enter and reside is a resident right, and there is 
no human right to enter and reside.91 
a. EU Citizens
European Union citizens have freedom of movement, which gives 
them the right to enter and reside within the territory of a member state 
of which they are not a citizen.92  This state is referred to as the host 
member state.93  The right to reside in a host member state for less than 
three months is without conditions for EU citizens and their family 
members.94  The only EU citizens who have a right to reside in a host 
member state for more than three months are those who are workers or 
self-employed, “have sufficient resources for themselves and their 
family members not to become a burden on the social assistance 
system of the host member state during their period of residence and 
have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host member 
state,” or are students and have comprehensive health insurance.95  EU 
citizens have the right to reside in the host member state as long as the 
conditions for residence continue to be satisfied.96  The rights that EU 
citizens have to reside in a host member state are not absolute.  Host 
member states retain the right to restrict these individuals’ freedom of 
movement and residence based on public policy, public safety, and 
public health grounds.97  After residing in a host member state for five 
years, an EU citizen has the right to permanent residence in the host 
91. This article does not address the rights of refugees or an individual’s right to a
refugee determination within a state.  The debates surrounding an individual’s right to enter 
in the refugee and asylum context is beyond the scope of this article.   
92. Council Directive 2004/38, arts. 5-6, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77, 91-92 (EC).[hereinafter
EU Citizen Entry & Residence Directive]. 
93. See e.g., id.
94. Id. at art. 6.  The EU citizens and their family members only need to have a valid
identification card or passport.   
95. Id. at art. 7.
96. Id. at art. 14(2).
97. Id. at art. 27.
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member state.98 
b. Third-country nationals
TCNs’ ability to enter and reside in an EU member state is 
dictated by domestic law.99  Once a TCN obtains long-term resident 
status, however, that individual has a robust right to enter and reside in 
the country granting that status.  Long-term resident status is available 
to TCNs who “have resided legally and continuously within its territory 
for five years immediately prior to the submission of the relevant 
application” pursuant to a Council Directive.100 Member states must 
require TCNs to demonstrate that they have “stable and regular 
resources which are sufficient to maintain himself/herself and the 
members of his/her family, without recourse to the social assistance 
system of the Member State concerned” and health insurance.101  
Finally, member states can require applicants to “comply with 
integration conditions, in accordance with national law.”102  Once these 
requirements have been satisfied, the TCN obtains long-term resident 
status within the member state, which is a permanent status.103 
Long-term residents have a limited right to enter and reside in a 
member state other than the one that granted long-term resident status. 
This state is referred to as the second member state.104  The long-term 
resident’s ability to enter and reside in a second member state is 
contingent on the individual engaging in economic activity (employed 
or self-employed capacity), pursuing educational studies or vocational 
training, or other specified purposes.105  These rights are not absolute 
because the second member state can limit the number of long-term 
residents from other member states allowed to enter and reside 
98. EU Citizen Entry & Residence Directive, supra note 92, at art. 16(1).
99. See e.g., FRA EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUND. RIGHTS, HANDBOOK ON
EUROPEAN LAW RELATING TO ASYLUM, BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION 26, 40 (2014), 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2013/handbook-european-law-relating-asylum-borders-
and-immigration [hereinafter European Law Handbook]. 
100. Long-Term Residents Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 3(2). The directive
excludes individuals pursuing educational studies or vocational training, those who have 
applied for, or have been granted, temporary protection, and those who have applied for, or 
have been granted, “a subsidiary form of protection in accordance with international 
obligations, national legislation or the practice of the Member States.”. 
101. Long-Term Resident Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 5(1).
102. Id. at art. 5(2).  See infra Part IV(C) for a more detailed discussion about the use of
integration requirements. 
103. Long-Term Resident Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 8(1)-(2) (noting the
Member State shall issue an EC residence permit that is valid for at least five years, and is 
automatically renewed upon expiry).  
104. Id. at art. 2(d).
105. Id. at art. 14(2).
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“provided that such limitations are already set out for the admission of 
third-country nationals in the existing legislation at the time of the 
adoption of this Directive.”106  Long-term residents who reside in a 
second member state are required to obtain a residence permit no later 
than three months after entering the second member state.107  The 
second member state can require the long-term resident to demonstrate 
that they have “stable and regular resources which are sufficient to 
maintain themselves and the members of their families, without 
recourse to the social assistance system of the Member State 
concerned” and health insurance.108  The second member state can also 
require the long-term resident to comply with integration measures.109  
Any requirement to satisfy integration requirements will not apply to 
long-term residents who had to satisfy integration requirements to 
obtain their long-term residence permit in the first member state.110  
However, the second member state can require the long-term resident 
to attend language courses.111  The second member state can also refuse 
a long-term residence application when the applicant “constitutes a 
threat to public policy or public security.”112  In making the decision to 
deny a long-term residence application, the second member state is 
directed to “consider the severity or type of offence against public 
policy or public security committed by the long-term resident.”113 
c. Derivative Rights
The family members of EU citizens and long-term resident TCNs 
have a derivative right to enter the territory of EU member states.114  
The derivative right to enter the territory of member states stems from 
the European Union citizen’s or long-term resident’s right to free 
movement.  The first rules adopted on the free movement of workers 
gave workers the right to be accompanied by their spouse, children 
under twenty-one years old, dependent children over twenty-one years 
old, and dependent parents and grandparents.115  The Free Movement 
Directive explicitly stated, “irrespective of their nationality” these 
106. Id. at art. 14(4).
107. Id. at art. 15(1).
108. Id. at art. 15(2).
109. Long-Term Resident Council Directive, supra note 86,. at art. 15(3).
110. Id. at art. 15(3).
111. Id. at art. 15(3).
112. Id. at art. 17(1).
113. Id. at art. 17(1).
114. Council Directive 86/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 251) 12 (EC) [hereinafter Family
Reunification Council Directive]. 
115. See European Law Handbook, supra note 99, at 119-20
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family members “have the right to install themselves with a worker 
who is a national of one member state and who is employed in the 
territory of another member state.”116  Similar rights were extended to 
the family members of long-term resident TCNs  because they have a 
similar freedom to move throughout the European Union.117  The rights 
of family members to enter the territory of a state in which an EU 
citizen or long-term resident is working was based on the idea that if 
workers could not move with their family members the worker’s 
freedom of movement would be restricted.118 
European Union citizens’ and long-term residents’ freedom of 
movement created a derivative right of entry for their family members. 
Yet this right only existed when the EU citizen or long-term resident 
was working in a state other than their state of citizenship or the state 
that granted long-term resident status.  This led to a situation in which 
EU citizens residing within their state of citizenship and long-term 
residents residing within the state that granted long-term resident status 
had fewer rights to live with their non-citizen family members. 
Paradoxically, in many EU Member States EU nationals exercising 
free movement rights enjoy far greater rights to family reunification 
than the states’ own nationals do. Family reunification for EU 
nationals who have not made use of free movement rights is 
regulated by national law, which remains more restrictive in some 
EU Member States.119 
The European Court of Justice addressed two aspects of this issue 
in 2014.  First, in O v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel 
and Minister voor Immigratie, Integatie en Asiel v. B, the court held 
that when EU citizens return to their country of citizenship after 
exercising their free movement rights in another member state, their 
116. Long-Term Resident Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 10(1).
117. Family Reunification Council Directive, supra note 114 (whereas statements).
118. See European Law Handbook, supra note 99, at 120.  For long-term residents, the
second member state can, but is not required, to authorize the entry and residence of other 
family members like dependent parents, dependent adult children, and unmarried partners.  
Long-Term Resident Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 16(2).  The admission of 
family members can be made contingent upon providing evidence that they “have resided as 
members of the family of the long-term resident in the first member state,” “have stable and 
regular resources which are sufficient to maintain themselves without recourse to the social 
assistance system of the Member State concerned or that the long-term resident has such 
resources and insurance for them” and health insurance.  Id. at art. 16(4). The family 
members, like the long-term resident, can be denied entry if they “constitute[] a threat to 
public policy or public security.”  Id. at art. 17(1). As with the long-term resident, the 
second member state is required to “consider the severity or type of offence against public 
policy or public security committed by the long-term resident or his/her family member(s), 
or the danger that emanates from the person concerned.”  Id. at art. 17(2). 
119. European Law Handbook, supra note 99, at 120.
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family members have a derivative right of entry and residence in the 
EU citizen’s state of origin.120  The court interpreted a number of EU 
directives and concluded that depriving EU citizens of the ability to 
return to their state of citizenship with family members, when those 
familial relationships were created while exercising their free 
movement rights, would restrict the citizen’s freedom of movement.121  
Second, in S & G v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, the 
court similarly held that the same derivative right to enter and reside 
exists for third-country national family members of EU citizens when 
“the citizen resides in [their state of citizenship] but regularly travels to 
another Member State as a worker.”122  The derivative rights to enter 
and reside are only available to the family members of EU citizens and 
long-term resident third-country nationals.  These rights are not based 
on personhood, but rather family connections to citizens and 
individuals with the long-term resident immigration status. 
d. Third-country nationals who are not long-term residents
For third-country nationals who are not long-term residents, their 
right to enter and reside within an EU member state is based on 
national law.  While there is an EU Directive outlining the rights of 
TCNs workers within the EU, it only applies to those who are legally 
residing and authorized to work pursuant to national law or practice.123  
The family members of TCNs who are not long-term residents, but are 
authorized to enter and reside pursuant to national law, also have a 
derivative right of entry and residence.124  The derivative rights only 
exist for the spouse and minor children of TCNs that have a residence 
permit issued by a member state that is valid for one year or more and 
“who has reasonable prospects of obtaining the right of permanent 
residence.”125  Member states can require children over the age of 
120. Case C-456/12, O. v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integatie en Asiel & Minister voor
Immigratie, Integatie en Asiel v. B., 2014 E.C.R. 135, at para. 50. 
121. Id.
122. Case C-457/12, S & G v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, 2014
E.C.R. 136, at para. 44.
123. Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country 
nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of 
rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State, 2011 O.J. L343/1, 
(2011) [hereinafter Third-Country Nationals Directive]. 
124. Family Reunification Council Directive, supra note 114, at 12.
125. Id. at art 3-4. These rights do not extend to individuals who have applied for, or
have been granted, temporary protection, and those who have applied for, or have been 
granted, “a subsidiary form of protection in accordance with international obligations, 
national legislation or the practice of the Member States.”  Id. at art. 3(2). Other family 
members, such as dependent parents, dependent adult children, and unmarried partners may 
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twelve who “arrive[] independently from the rest of his/her family” to 
satisfy integration requirements provided for in existing legislation.126  
Member states can also deny these family members entry and the 
ability to reside on grounds of public policy, public security, and public 
health.127 
The ability of noncitizens to enter and reside in a country that is 
not their country of nationality is significantly limited.  The United 
States treats the admission and residence of noncitizens as a 
privilege.128  United States federal law outlines who is eligible for 
admission and residence, but no noncitizen has the right to enter and 
reside in the United States; not even the spouse or noncitizen children 
of a United States citizen.129  European Union citizens have the right to 
enter and reside in member states that are not their state of nationality, 
and those rights extend to specified family members.  However, even 
EU citizens’ right is not absolute.  Host member states may prevent the 
entry and residence of other European Union citizens (and their family 
members) if those individuals pose a threat to public policy, public 
safety, or public health.  Third-country nationals that have obtained 
long-term residence within a member state have similar rights to move 
throughout the European Union, but the initial grant of long-term 
residence status is based on national law.  Additionally, the initial entry 
of third-country nationals into EU member states is based exclusively 
on national law.  Neither international law nor regional law is playing a 
role in granting these noncitizens the ability to enter or reside in a state 
other than their state of nationality.  This is an area in which national 
sovereignty remains quite strong and absolute.  Thus, the right to enter 
and reside for noncitizens are resident and membership rights rather 
than human rights.  These rights are only available to individuals with 
certain immigration statuses and citizens. 
2. The Right to Remain
The right to remain, or the right not to be deported, is another
right that traditionally has been limited to individuals with citizenship 
status.  Only those individuals who are considered full members of the 
national community have been granted the right to remain and 
be admitted to join the third-country national, but it is not required.  Id. at art. 4(2-3). 
126. Id. at art. 4(1).
127. Note that second Member States cannot deny a long-term resident’s family
members entry and residence based on public health.  Long-Term Resident Council 
Directive, supra note 86, at art. 17-18. 
128. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20).
129. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b), 1153.
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protection against deportation, removal, or expulsion.  Post-World War 
II the status conferring full membership within a State has been 
citizen.130  While noncitizens do not have an absolute right to remain in 
a state of which they are not a citizen, deportation is regulated by law. 
Domestic law articulates the specific grounds upon which a noncitizen 
can be deported and domestic law and international human rights law 
specify the procedures that must be followed in doing so.  These laws 
also protect noncitizens against arbitrary deportation and collective 
deportation.131  The United States and European countries protect the 
ability of noncitizens to remain differently.  In the United States, all 
noncitizens are subject to the statutory deportation grounds.  It does not 
matter what one’s immigration status is, or how long one has resided in 
the United States.132  All that matters is that one is not a United States 
citizen.  This approach is softened with the availability of discretionary 
relief from deportation.  Immigration judges have discretion within 
certain boundaries to cancel a deportation order and allow the 
noncitizen to remain in the United States with lawful immigration 
status.133  Due to concerns within Congress in the 1990s that 
immigration judges were exercising discretion favorably on behalf of 
noncitizens too frequently, fewer noncitizens are eligible for 
discretionary relief.134  The European approach is different. Length of 
residence and immigration status determine which deportation grounds 
are applicable.  The longer one has resided as a lawful resident the 
fewer deportation grounds apply.  Personhood is not the basis for 
providing protection against deportation, rather it is citizenship, length 
of residence, and immigration status.  Thus, the robust right to remain 
in EU member states should be viewed as a resident right and the 
absolute right to remain as a membership right. 
While proportionality is institutionalized in deportation 
proceedings throughout Europe, national citizens are the only 
individuals with absolute protection against deportation.  All other 
rights protecting noncitizens from deportation are limited; thus, 
national citizenship remains the “main determinant of individual rights 
130. At earlier times in American and European history full membership has been based
on local affiliations. 
131. See, e.g., Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Securing Certain Rights and Freedoms Other than Those 
Already Included in the Convention and in the First Protocol Thereto, art. 4, Sep. 16, 1963, 
E.T.S. No. 46. 
132. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227.
133. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
134. See Banks, supra note 11.
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and privileges” in the deportation context, contrary to Soysal's claim.135  
The limited rights that safeguard third-country nationals from 
deportation, however, are significant and they provide substantially 
more protection than is available in the United States. 
Pursuant to EU law, there are three main categories of protection 
against deportation for EU citizens and their third-country national 
family members residing outside of the EU citizen’s state of 
citizenship.  First, deportation decisions based on public policy or 
public security must “take account of considerations such as how long 
the individual concerned has resided on its territory, his/her age, state 
of health, family and economic situation, social and cultural integration 
into the host member state and the extent of his/her links with the 
country of origin.”136  Second, EU citizens and their family members 
with the right to permanent residence can only be deported based on 
“serious grounds of public policy or public security.”137  Finally, EU 
citizens and their family members who have resided in a host member 
state for ten years and minors cannot be deported except for 
“imperative grounds of public security.”138  Long-term resident TCNs 
have similar protections.  They can only be deported when they 
constitute “an actual and sufficiently serious threat to public policy or 
public security.”139  Before a long-term resident can be deported 
pursuant to this provision, the member state must consider the length of 
time of residence, the person’s age, the consequences for the long-term 
resident and their family, and the person’s “links with the country of 
residence or the absence of links with the country of origin.”140 
The use of a proportionality analysis to limit the deportation of 
EU citizens, their family members, and TCN long-term residents is 
based on the right to private life and family life.  This right is protected 
pursuant to domestic law, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights, and Council 
Directives.141  There is robust European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”) jurisprudence on the interaction between a noncitizen’s 
right to private life and family life and a state’s sovereign authority to 
deport noncitizens.142  Article 8 of the European Convention on the 
135. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 12. 
136. EU Citizen Entry & Residence Directive, supra note 92, at art. 28(1).
137. Id. at art. 28(2).
138. Id. at art. 28(3).
139. Long-Term Resident Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 12(1).
140. Id. at art. 12(3).
141. See, e.g., European Law Handbook, supra note 99, at 117.
142. See Chair and J.B. v. Germany, App. No. 69735/01, HUDOC (2007),
http://www.echr.coe.int; Kaya v. Germany, App. No. 31753/02, HUDOC (2007), 
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Protection of Human Rights states, “[e]veryone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”143  
Any interference with this right must be “in accordance with the law” 
and “necessary in a democratic society.”144  The ECtHR has interpreted 
“necessary in a democratic society” to mean a measure that is “justified 
by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued.”145  Within the deportation context the ECtHR 
reviews a deportation order to see if the “legitimate [State] aim 
pursued” and the “seriousness of the interference with the applicant’s 
right to respect for their family life” have been appropriately 
balanced.146  The State aim involved is generally preventing disorder as 
most third-party nationals are ordered deported based on criminal 
convictions.147  Noncitizens have argued that the “seriousness of the 
interference” with private and/or family life was evident in the fact that 
deportation would separate them from their spouse, partner, children, 
parents or siblings, and that it “would be unreasonable for their family 
http://www.echr.coe.int; Maslov v. Austria, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 20 (2007); Sezen v. The 
Netherlands, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30 (2006); Üner v. The Netherlands, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 
(2006); Lupsa v. Romania, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 36 (2006); Keles v. Germany, 44 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 12 (2005); Radovanovic v. Austria, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 6 (2004); Jakupovic v. Austria, 
38 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27 (2003); Mokrani v. France, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 (2003); Slivenko v. 
Latvia, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24 (2003); Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37 (2002); 
Yildiz v. Austria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 (2002); Amrollahi v. Denmark, App. No. 56811/00, 
HUDOC (2002), http://www.echr.coe.int; Ezzouhdi v. France, App. No. 47160/99, HUDOC 
(2001), http://www.echr.coe.int; Bensaid v. United Kingdom, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10 (2001); 
Boultif v. Switzerland, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50 (2001); Baghli v. France, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 
(1999); Bouchelkia v. France, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 686 (1999); El Boujaïdi v. France, 30 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 223 (1999); Mehemi v. France, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 739 (1999); Dalia v. France, 33 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 26 (1998); Boujlifa v. France, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 419 (1997); Boughanemi v. 
France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 228 (1996); C v. Belgium, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 2 (1996); Nasri v. 
France, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 458 (1995); Lamguindaz v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
213 (1993); Beldjoudi v. France, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32 801 (1992); Moustaquim v. Belgium, 
13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802 (1991); Berrehab v. The Netherlands, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 322 (1988); 
see also Angela M. Banks, Deporting Families: Political Question or Legal Issue?, 27 GA. 
STATE. U. LAW REV. 489-563 (2011). 
143. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221]. 
144. Id. at art. 8(2) (stating the interference must be “necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”).  
145. Moustaquim v. Belgium, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 802, at para. 43 (1991); see also
Berrehab, supra note 142, at para 29. 
146. Berrehab, supra note 142.
147. See Banks, supra note 142, at 532. The third-country nationals were ordered
deported for criminal convictions running the spectrum of assault, burglary, drug trafficking, 
and rape.  See, e.g., Beldjoudi, supra note 142; Aoulmi v. France, App. No. 50278/99, 
HUDOC (2006), http://www.echr.coe.int; Amrollahi supra note 142; Baghli v. France, 33 
Eur. H.R. 32; Bouchelkia supra note 142. 
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members to join them in their state of nationality because of language 
barriers, economic opportunities, or distance from non-nuclear family 
members.”148  In conducting this proportionality review the ECtHR 
weighs the state’s interest in public safety against the “noncitizen’s 
affiliation with the state of residence, but also with his or her state of 
nationality.”149  In seventeen out of twenty-eight cases decided between 
1988 and mid-2008, the ECtHR held that the state had violated a third-
country national’s right to family life by ordering deportation.150 
The right to private life and family life is a right that is available 
based on personhood—it is available to all noncitizens.  However, the 
ability of this right to limit a State’s power to deport a noncitizen 
depends on the noncitizen’s length of residence and immigration status. 
Adjudicators seek to balance the noncitizen’s interest in remaining in 
the state of residence and the State’s interest in protecting sovereign 
interests like public security.  This type of proportionality analysis 
provides a great deal of protection to certain noncitizens, but it does not 
create an absolute right to remain.  That right is only available to 
citizens.  Thus, a robust right to remain in EU member states should be 
viewed as a resident right and the absolute right to remain as a 
membership right. 
3. Economic Activity Rights
An individual’s ability to work or engage in self-employment
depends on their citizenship status and immigration status.  For citizens 
this right is absolute, however domestic law may limit the types of 
work that an individual can perform.151  For noncitizens, this right 
depends on the permission that was granted upon entry.  Economic 
activity rights should be classified as resident rights and membership 
rights.  Limited economic activity rights are resident rights and the 
more robust economic activity rights are membership rights because 
personhood is not the basis by which these rights are allocated.  Once 
noncitizens are granted permission to work within a specific state they 
are generally granted the same protections as citizen workers.  For 
example, protection against discrimination and the protection of 
workplace safety regulations.152  However, states can and do limit 
access to certain jobs based on citizenship status.  For example, in the 
United States state governments can limit state government jobs to U.S. 
148. Banks, supra note 142, at 528. 
149. Id. at 539.
150. Id. at 538-39.
151. For example, in the United States sex work is illegal in most jurisdictions.
152. See, e.g., European Law Handbook, supra note 99, at 184-85. 
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citizens if the job “go[es] to the heart of representative government.”153  
The United States Supreme Court has held that peace officers, state 
troopers, and school teachers are such jobs.154  Similarly within the 
European Union member states can restrict noncitizens’ access to jobs 
that involve “the exercise of public authority” and safeguarding the 
general public interest.155 
Unlike other rights that are key for immigrant incorporation, 
postnational citizenship scholars acknowledge that the right to work is 
not a right that is based on personhood.  Soysal states that “a person’s 
specific legal status as a noncitizen is the most important [factor]” that 
determines a noncitizen’s right to engage in economic activity.156  
Because citizenship and immigration status dictate access to this right, 
it is best viewed as a membership right in its most robust form and a 
resident right in its weaker form. 
Within the European Union citizenship status and immigration 
status dictate a noncitizen’s access to the labor market.  Access to 
employment is regulated differently for EU citizens and TCNs.  EU 
citizens’ freedom of movement includes the right to nondiscrimination 
in the employment context.157  Thus, EU citizens have equal access to 
the labor market in any EU member state.  However, there is a public 
service exception.158  Additionally, an EU citizens’ right to work in a 
member state of which he or she is not a national can be limited based 
on public policy, public security, and public health.159 
Third-country nationals’ ability to work within the European 
Union is shaped by three factors: familial relationship with an EU 
citizen, length of residence, and immigration status.  When an EU 
citizen exercises their freedom of movement and resides in a host 
member state, their third-country family members have the right to 
work in the host member state as well.160  Long-term residents are 
entitled to the same access to the labor market as EU citizens.161  Long-
term residents’ family members are able to work within the European 
153. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
154. Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal
Protection Review of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Peña, 76 OR. L. REV. 425, 434-35 (1997) (citing Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 
(1982) (peace officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 69-72 (1979) (school teachers); 
Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297-300 (1978) (state troopers)). 
155. EC Council Directive, supra note 23.
156. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 125-26. 
157. EU Treaty, supra note 23.
158. Id. at art. 45(4).
159. Id. at art. 45(2).
160. EU Citizen Entry & Residence Directive, supra note 92, at art. 23.
161. Long-Term Resident Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 11(1)(a).
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Union, but each member state determines the conditions for such 
employment.162  Member states are also free to restrict third-country 
nationals’ parents’ and adult unmarried children’s access to the labor 
market.163 
For TCNs who do not qualify for long-term residence, the right to 
work is dictated by the terms of entry.  For example, TCNs with a Blue 
Card have limited access to the labor market for two years, and then 
they have equal access to “highly qualified employment” for the 
remainder of their stay within the European Union.164  The Blue Card 
grants a TCN the right to enter and reside within a European Union 
member state “for the purpose of highly qualified employment.”165  
Highly qualified employment is a term of art defined as employment in 
which the worker is protected as an employee, is paid, and has “higher 
professional qualifications.”166  Blue Card holders can change their 
employment within the first two years, but have to obtain prior 
authorization by the relevant state authorities.167  After two years such 
changes do not require prior authorization, but the Blue Card holder 
must inform the proper authorities.168  Finally, TCN family members of 
Blue Card holders have access to the labor market.169 
TCN workers who are not engaged in “highly qualified 
employment,” are granted access to the labor market for the “specific 
employment activity authorized under” their entry and residence 
permit.170  This is similar to the nonimmigrant visa category in the 
United States.  These noncitizens are entitled to equal treatment in 
working conditions, health and safety workplace protections, freedom 
of association and affiliation, and membership in an organization 
representing workers.171  If these workers qualify for family 
162. Family Reunification Council Directive, supra note 114, at art. 14(2).
163. Id. at art. 14(3).
164. EC Council Directive, supra note 23, at art. 12(1). However, any restrictions that
apply to nationals, E.U. citizens, or EEA citizens also apply to Blue Card holders.  Id. at art. 
12(4). 
165. Id. at art. 1(a).
166. Id. at art. 2(b).
167. Id. at art. 12(2).
168. Id. at art. 12(2).
169. Id. at art. 15(1); see also Family Reunification Council Directive, supra note 114, at
art. 14(1). 
170. Council Directive 2004/38, arts. 5-6, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77, 91-92 (EC); Directive
2011/98/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 13 December 2011 on a 
single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and 
work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country 
workers legally residing in a Member State, 2011 O.J. L343/1, art. 11(c) (2011) [hereinafter 
Third-Country National Workers Directive].  
171. Id. at art. 23(1).
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reunification, their family members are granted access to the labor 
market, subject to certain conditions.172 
Some TCNs are admitted to European Union member states for 
seasonal work.173  Similar to the nonimmigrant visa category in the 
United States, these noncitizens have the right to exercise the specific 
employment activity specified in their entry and residence permit 
during the period of their authorized stay.174  These noncitizens are 
entitled to equal treatment with citizens for employment terms, the 
right to “strike and take industrial action in accordance with host 
member state’s national law,” back payments for outstanding 
remuneration, and certain social security benefits.175 
Noncitizens’ access to the labor market in EU member states is 
based on their immigration status.  The specific purpose for which a 
noncitizen is admitted determines their access to the labor market. 
Those noncitizens granted indefinite leave to reside are granted 
economic activity rights that closely mirror those of citizens.  All other 
noncitizens’ access to the labor market and right to engage in economic 
activity is determined based on actual labor market needs. 
Noncitizens’ rights in this context closely mirror those of citizens when 
the noncitizens’ connections to the state mirror those of citizens. 
Absent such connections, the right to engage in economic activity is 
limited and based on national sovereign interests.  Therefore, 
noncitizens’ limited economic activity rights are resident rights and the 
more robust economic activity rights are membership rights. 
4. Political Participation Rights
Noncitizens’ ability to vote in national or local elections varies
widely across Europe.  Only in the United Kingdom and Portugal are 
TCNs able to vote in national elections.176  However, this right to vote 
is limited to certain categories of TCNs.  Access to local voting rights 
is more common.  European Union citizens have local voting rights 
throughout Europe pursuant to the Treaty of Maastricht.177 
Third-country nationals have local voting rights in fifteen 
172. Family Reunification Council Directive, supra note 114, at art. 14(1).
173. Directive 2014/36/EU of the Eur. Parliament and of the Council of 26 February
2014 on the Conditions of Entry and Stay of Third-Country Nat’ls for the Purpose of Emp. 
as Seasonal Workers, art. 3(2)(e), 2014 O.J. (L94) 36, (2014) [hereinafter TCNs Seasonal 
Worker Directive]. 
174. Id. at art. 11(c).
175. Third-Country National Workers Directive, supra note 170, at art. 23(1).
176. International Key Findings, MIGRANT INTEGRATION POL’Y INDEX (2015),
http://www.mipex.eu/key-findings [hereinafter MIPEX].  
177. EU Treaty, supra note 23.
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European countries.178  There are four common conditions used to 
determine noncitizen voting rights.  The conditions are duration of 
residence, registration, residence status, or reciprocity.179  The required 
period of residence ranges from three to five years.  For example, 
TCNs must reside in Denmark, Estonia, Portugal, and Sweden for three 
years before being eligible to vote.180  The residence requirement is 
four years in Finland and five years in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands.181  Certain states require TCNs to register with local 
authorities.  In numerous countries, such as Ireland, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, and Nordic states the registration process is 
simple and mirrors that required of nationals when moving to a new 
address.182  However, Belgium requires more than simple registration. 
Applicants for voting rights must also “sign a declaration pledging 
respect to the Belgium Constitution and legislation.”183  Another 
condition for voting rights is permanent residence or long-term 
residence status.  For example, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia condition local voting rights on having this type of 
residence status.184  Finally, certain states condition TCNs’ local voting 
rights on reciprocity.  TCNs from state A are allowed to vote in local 
elections in state B if citizens of state B have similar voting rights in 
state A.185  The Czech Republic, Malta, Portugal, and Spain all 
condition voting rights on the existence of bilateral agreements 
granting voting rights to their citizens.186  However, the Czech 
Republic and Malta do not have any voting reciprocity agreements so 
TCNs do not have local voting rights in these countries.187 
More complex registration requirements, like those in Belgium, 
and permanent or long-term residence status requirements limit voting 
rights to TCNs who are able to demonstrate national cultural 
178. Kees Groenendijk, Voting Rights for Nationals of Non-EU States, 
BUNDESZENTRALE FÜR POLITISCHE BILDUNG (May 22, 2013), https://perma.cc/7HBY-
6H8M. TCNs obtain voting rights after three years in Denmark, Estonia, Portugal, and 
Sweden.  Id.  After four years TCNs are eligible for local voting rights in Finland and after 
five years in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.  Id.  
179. Id. at 4.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 4-5.
183. Id.
184.  Groenendijk, supra note 178, at 5. 
185.  Id. (meaning that nationals of country A can vote in country B only if nationals of
country B can vote in country A, mostly on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the 
two countries).  
186. Id. at 3.
187. Id.  Spain has one such agreement with Norway and Portugal has a number of such
agreements, adopting ten in recent years.  
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belonging.188  In Belgium, national cultural belonging is measured 
based on a pledge to respect the national constitution and national 
laws.189  In countries that condition voting rights on residence status, 
TCNs have had to demonstrate national cultural belonging in order to 
obtain permanent residence or long-term residence status.  As will be 
discussed in Part III, before TCNs can obtain these residence statuses 
they must demonstrate integration with regard to language, country 
knowledge, and national values before obtaining permanent residence 
or long-term residence status.190 
The availability of voting rights is widely available to EU citizens 
throughout Europe, but it is more restricted for TCNs.191  Voting rights 
represent the most traditional form of political participation and non-
citizen voting rights throughout Europe vary greatly.192  EU citizens 
have local voting rights throughout Europe, but TCNs’ local voting 
rights are conditioned on duration of residence, registration, residence 
status, or reciprocity.193  Contrary to the claims of postnational 
citizenship scholars, no European state grants TCNs voting rights based 
on personhood.  This type of political participation is conditioned on 
national cultural belonging in states that have heightened registration 
requirements and those that condition voting rights on long-term 
residence status.  Therefore, it is best to view voting rights as resident 
rights or membership rights depending on the regime used to allocate 
them.  In countries that condition voting rights on residence or simple 
registration requirements, voting rights should be viewed as a resident 
right.  For countries that condition voting rights on a status or 
registration requirements that measure national cultural belonging, 
voting rights should be viewed as membership rights. 
5. Education Rights
Education is an important aspect of the immigrant incorporation
process.  Education in western democracies not only provides 
188. Id.
189. Id. at 4-5.
190. The countries are Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  MIPEX, 
supra note 176. Groenendijk also notes that conditioning voting rights on permanent 
residence or long-term residence status “may severely limit the number of third-country 
nationals who can vote since the national governments in these countries grant the required 
status infrequently or only to specific categories of immigrants (e.g., co-ethnics).”  
Groenendijk, supra note 178, at 5.  
191. Groenendijk, supra note 178, at 5. 
192. Id.; Sarah Song, Democracy and Noncitizen Voting Rights, 13 CITIZENSHIP 
STUDIES 607, 607-08 (2009). 
193. Groenendijk, supra note 164, at 4.
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individuals with skills and knowledge necessary for participating in the 
labor market, it also serves as an important site for socialization.  This 
is the one right discussed in this article that most conforms to the 
claims made by postnational citizenship scholars.  Access to primary 
and secondary education is available based on personhood. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
guarantees all individuals, EU citizens and TCNs alike, a right to 
education, which includes the right to “free compulsory education.”194  
The language in this provision is universal, stating that “[e]veryone has 
the right to education and to have access to vocational and continuing 
training.”195  Therefore, individuals who have long-term residence 
status, Blue Card holders, seasonal workers, and other workers, along 
with their family members, all have equal access to education and 
vocational training.196  Pursuant to secondary EU law, “all third-
country national children in the EU, except those only present for a 
short period of time, are entitled to access basic education.”197  This 
right extends to TCN children who are unauthorized, but whose 
deportation has been postponed.198 
Unlike the right to enter, reside, remain, economic activity rights, 
and political participation rights, education rights do conform to the 
claims of postnational citizenship scholars because they are human 
rights.  Education rights are granted based on personhood and are 
194. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights art. 14 (The right to education “includes the
possibility to receive free compulsory education.”). The European Union Citizen Entry & 
Residence Directive ensures that this right to education is realized for E.U. citizens residing 
outside of their country of nationality.  EU Citizen Entry & Residence Directive, supra note 
92, at art. 24(1); see also EU Treaty, supra note 23, at arts. 149, 150. 
195. EU Charter, supra note 176.
196. Long-Term Residence Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 11(1)(b); Family
Reunification Council Directive, supra note 111, at art. 14(1)(a); EC Council Directive, 
supra note 23, at arts. 14(1)(c), 15(1) (granting family members the rights outlined in the 
Family Reunification Directive & granting Blue Card holders equal treatment with nationals 
of the host Member State with regard to education and vocational training); Third-Country 
National Workers Directive, supra note 170, at art. 12(1)(c); Family Reunification Council 
Directive, supra note 114, at arts. 3(1); TCNs Seasonal Worker Directive, supra note 173, at 
art. 23(1)(g).  The family members of other workers and seasonal workers have equal access 
to education if they have a residence permit valid for one year or more and reasonable 
prospect of obtaining a right of permanent residence.  Family Reunification Council 
Directive, supra note 114, at arts. 3(1), 14(1)(a).  Other workers can be denied study and 
maintenance grants and loans or other grants and loans, and they can be required to pay fees 
for university and post-secondary education and vocational training that is “not directly 
linked to the specific employment activity.”  Third-Country National Workers Directive, 
supra note 170, at art. 12(2)(a).  Additionally, these workers can be required to demonstrate 
language skills to access university and post-secondary education and vocational training.  
Id.  
197. European Law Handbook, supra note 99, at 197.
198. Id. 
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divorced from national cultural belonging.  This is an important 
development in the protection of citizenship rights, yet it is the 
exception rather than the rule.  Despite the disaggregating of 
citizenship rights and the decoupling of many of these rights from 
citizenship status, the majority of the rights critical for immigrant 
incorporation continue to be conditioned on national cultural 
belonging. 
IV. CIVIC INTEGRATION
Post-World War II Western liberal democratic states have 
disaggregated citizenship rights, and the allocation of many of these 
rights has been decoupled from citizenship status.  At the time that 
Soysal wrote her groundbreaking book, a growing number of rights 
were being made available to noncitizens.  Yet, since 1994 an 
increasing number of EU member states are conditioning access to 
long-term resident status on civic integration.  Rights that are critical 
for immigrant incorporation—the right to enter, reside, remain, work, 
and vote—continue to be allocated based on national cultural 
belonging rather than personhood.  National cultural belonging has 
been a basis for granting citizenship status, and it is increasingly 
becoming a basis for granting long-term residence status.  At least 
fourteen EU member states require third-country nationals (“TCNs”) to 
demonstrate integration with regard to language, country knowledge, 
and national values before obtaining a legal status that grants them 
citizenship rights.199  Six of these countries require certain TCNs to 
demonstrate their integration before being allowed to enter the 
country.200  As the previous section explains, it is long-term residence 
status that enables noncitizens to have a robust set of citizenship rights 
to facilitate their long-term integration. 
This Part analyzes the national rules governing access to long-
term residence status in the Netherlands, France, and Germany.  The 
focus is on these three countries because they are home to a significant 
number of TCNs. In 2014, forty-six percent of long-term resident 
TCNs arriving in Europe were in the Netherlands, France, and 
199. These countries include  Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. 
MIPEX, supra note 176.   
200.  Saskia Bonjour, The Transfer of Pre-Departure Integration Requirements for
Family Migrants among Member States of the European Union, 2 COMPARATIVE 
MIGRATION STUDIES 205 (2014), https://www.imiscoe.org/journal-cms-2/comparative-
migration-studies-2014-2/68-5-bonjour-s-2014-the-transfer-of-pre-departure-integration-
requirements-for-family-migrants-among-member-states-of-the-european-union/file.  The 
countries are Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.   
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Germany.201  These countries have also had different models of 
immigrant integration.  The Dutch model has been termed 
“multicultural” in which the state provides easy access to citizenship 
status and recognizes the “right of ethnic minority groups to maintain 
their cultural differences.”202  Scholars refer to the French model as 
“assimilationist” because the state provides easy access to citizenship 
status, “but requires from migrants a high degree of assimilation in the 
public sphere and gives little to no recognition of their cultural 
difference.”203  Finally, the German model has been described as 
“segregationist” or “exclusive.”204  Within this model, migrants who 
“do not share the ethnocultural background of the majority society” and 
are excluded “from the political community.”205  Migrants are not 
forced, however, “to give up their own cultures, and the state may even 
actively promote such cultures and discourage assimilation to the 
majority culture.”206  Despite decades of utilizing these different 
models for immigrant integration, the Netherlands, France, and 
Germany have come to adopt very similar integration requirements for 
long-term residents.207  The analysis in this section demonstrates that 
national cultural belonging remains an important basis for allocating 
citizenship rights even as citizenship rights are disaggregated and 
decoupled from citizenship status. 
A. National Cultural Belonging
The postnational citizenship model distinguishes between
national-based conceptions of citizenship and postnational conceptions 
of citizenship.  The former are based on national identity, which 
requires a historical or cultural tie to the state.208  Alternatively, a 
postnational approach to belonging and citizenship is based on 
201. Immigration, EUROSTAT (last visited Aug. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/RJ8H-LYYR.
202. RUUD KOOPMANS ET. AL., CONTESTED CITIZENSHIP: IMMIGRATION AND
CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN EUROPE 8 (2005). 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 11.
206. Id. This model is based on the assumption that migrants will not become long-term
residents.  Rather they will only remain as guest workers for a limited period of time.  
Efforts to support migrants in maintaining the cultural heritage of their nationality was seen 
as “facilitating their eventual repatriation.”   
207. For countries like Germany this new approach to immigrant integration reflects
acceptance of the fact that TCNs are not guest workers who will return home after a short 
stay. 
208. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 3 (“The model of national citizenship, anchored in
territorialized notions of cultural belonging, was dominant during the period of massive 
migration at the turn of the century, when immigrants were expected to be molded into 
national citizens.”). 
2017] BRINGING CULTURE BACK 353
personhood.209  Postnational citizenship scholars contend that their 
approach to citizenship allows a broader range of individuals to obtain 
citizenship rights because it divorces these rights from traditional ideas 
about national belonging that are rooted in cultural similarity.210  Yet, 
as this section will demonstrate national cultural belonging remains a 
critical criterion for obtaining a legal status that provides access to 
important citizenship rights. 
The development of a robust rights regime for TCNs grew out of 
concern that they were not sufficiently integrated into European 
society.  TCN integration was an explicit EU agenda item at the 1999 
Tampere European Council meeting.211  The Presidency Conclusions of 
that meeting envisioned “an EU immigration and integration policy 
that ensures ‘fair treatment’ of TCNs, granting them rights and 
obligations ‘comparable to EU citizens.’ ” 212  The need for this 
approach to TCN integration grew out of two realities.  First, TCNs 
were long-term residents within EU member states who would not be 
returning to their countries of origin.  Second, a significant number of 
TCNs were not naturalizing in their state of residence.  The failure to 
naturalize was often due to TCNs being ineligible to naturalize or 
onerous naturalization requirements.  Once it became clear that TCNs 
would not be eligible for EU citizenship, the EU began to develop a 
comprehensive rights regime to ensure that long-term resident TCNs 
had rights approximating those of EU citizens.  Basic or fundamental 
rights were allocated based on personhood, and thus covered TCNs, but 
other rights were based on national citizenship.213  The EU adopted 
measures to extend these citizenship rights to TCNs based on their 
long-term residence.  For example, freedom of movement is a right 
granted to EU citizens that would otherwise be unavailable to TCNs.214  
Pursuant to the Directive concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents, TCNs who obtain a long-term 
residence permit also have freedom of movement.215 
In adopting the Directive on Long-Term Residents, the EU 
209. SARAH WALLACE GOODMAN, IMMIGRATION AND MEMBERSHIP POLITICS IN
WESTERN EUROPE 2 (2014). 
210. See e.g., SOYSAL, supra note 6.
211. Anja Wiesbrock, Discrimination Instead of Integration? Integration Requirements
for Immigrants in Denmark and Germany, in ILLIBERAL LIBERAL STS.: IMMIGR., 
CITIZENSHIP AND INTEGRATION IN THE EU 299 (Sergio Carrera et. al., eds., 2009). 
212. Id. 
213. This reflects Bosniak’s idea of universal norms governing “citizenship within the
community” but not “citizenship at the border.”  Bosniak, supra note 4, at 33-35. 
214. EU Citizen Entry & Residence Directive, supra note 92, at art. 6.
215. Long-Term Residents Council Directive, supra note 86, at art. 14.
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Council acquiesced to member state desires to condition access to a 
long-term residence permit on evidence of cultural integration.  The 
Directive states that “member states may require third-country 
nationals to comply with integration conditions, in accordance with 
national law” as a condition for obtaining long-term residence status.216  
At the time that the Directive was adopted, 2003, a number of EU 
member states required TCNs seeking prolonged residence or 
settlement to demonstrate proficiency in the host country language and 
knowledge of the country’s values, norms, and practices.  These 
requirements grew out of a concern that a significant number of TCNs 
who had resided in EU member states had not been successfully 
integrated.  Employment rates, educational attainment, language skills, 
access to health and social services, and residential patterns suggested 
that TCNs were trailing significantly behind member state citizens.217  
In addition to traditional measures of immigrant integration, there was 
a growing sense that TCNs, particularly those from the Maghreb, had 
values and norms that were at odds with the mainstream EU values and 
norms.218  For example, the July 7, 2005, terrorist attacks in London 
committed by second-generation immigrants fueled the concern that 
TCNs were not culturally integrated.219  Member states responded to 
this concern by requiring TCNs who desired long-term resident permits 
to demonstrate that they could speak the language and were 
knowledgeable about the state’s history, values, and norms.  Member 
states viewed this requirement as a tool for maintaining social cohesion 
in the face of a culturally diverse immigration stream. 
The growing use of civic integration prerequisites for long-term 
resident status undermines the claim made by postnational citizenship 
scholars that a “new and more universal concept of citizenship” exists 
in Europe that is “based on universal personhood rather than national 
belonging.”220  The idea that this new form of citizenship is based on 
the idea that “incorporation into a system of membership rights does 
not inevitably require incorporation into the national collectivity” can 
no longer be viewed as accurate.221  Contrary to Soysal’s claim 
citizenship rights are not conferred “regardless of [a TCNs] historical 
216. Id. at art. 5(2).
217. Christian Joppke, Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for
Immigrants in Western Europe, 30 W. EUROPEAN POLITICS 6, 9 (2007). 
218. The Maghreb refers to Mauritania, Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and
Libya.  
219. See London Bombers: Key Facts, BBC NEWS (5:24 PM, Jul. 21, 2005),
https://perma.cc/CKS2-GUFK. 
220. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 1. See Wiesbrock, supra note 211.
221. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 3. 
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or cultural ties to that community.”222  Cultural ties to the national 
community remain critically important in allocating citizenship rights 
that facilitate immigration incorporation. 
B. Testing Integration
The growing trend of conditioning long-term resident status on
civic integration illustrates that liberal democracies in Europe have not 
broken away from the idea that national cultural belonging is a 
prerequisite for citizenship rights.223  While the EU has taken on a 
bigger role in regulating immigration, “the integration of third-country 
nationals (TCNs) is still essentially a matter of national control.”224  
States are learning from one another and increasingly conditioning 
access to long-term residence status, and the corresponding citizenship 
rights, on similar integration requirements.  The integration 
requirements focus on language skills, country knowledge, and national 
values to ensure that those granted citizenship rights culturally 
belong.225 
1. The Netherlands
The Netherlands was the first country to condition permanent
residence permits on demonstrating language skills, country 
knowledge, and national values.226  By the late 1990s, third-country 
nationals residing in the Netherlands were not successfully integrating 
into Dutch society.227  The majority of third-country nationals residing 
222. Id. “The model of national citizenship, anchored in territorialized notions of
cultural belonging, was dominant during the period of massive migration at the turn of the 
century, when immigrants were expected to be molded into national citizens.” 
223. See MIPEX, supra note 1176. At the time that the TCNs Long-term Residence
Directive was adopted many EU Member States had such an immigration status available 
that provided TCNs with the same rights as those required by the Directive.  See 
Groenendijk & Guild, supra note 80, at 40-41 (noting convergence of Member State laws 
regarding TCNs). 
224. Wiesbrock, supra note 211, at 299. (“By 2008, most member states have made the
access to various rights, ranging from initial residence rights to acquisition of citizenship, 
subject to the compliance with integration conditions.”). 
225. Sara Wallace Goodman, Integration Requirements for Integration’s Sake?
Identifying, Categorising and Comparing Civic Integration Policies, 36 J. ETHNIC & 
MIGRATION STUDIES 753, 759 (2010). 
 Culture as used in this article refers to values, norms, and practices.  Adopting the 
sociological understanding of values and norms, values as used in this project refer to 
“abstract ideals” and norms refer to “principles and rules of social life that people are 
expected to observe.” GIDDENS, supra note 6, at 54. 
226.  Goodman, supra note 225, at 759; Joppke, The Inevitable Lightening of
Citizenship, supra note 7, at 6-7; SARAH WALLACE GOODMAN, IMMIGRATION AND 
MEMBERSHIP POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE 163 (2014). 
227. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 6.
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in the Netherlands were from, and continue to be from, Turkey and the 
Maghreb, primarily Morocco.228  After the 1970s, the Netherlands, like 
most European countries, did not have significant labor migration.229  
The majority of migrants were asylum seekers or family migrants and 
they were often low- or unskilled workers, had little formal education, 
and no Dutch language skills.230  In terms of traditional incorporation 
measures, ethnic third-country nationals’ migrants’ unemployment 
rates, welfare dependency, high school drop-out rates, and 
incarceration rates far exceeded those of Dutch citizens.231  
Additionally, residential segregation was high.232  Government officials 
responded to this integration failure by adopting civic integration 
policies.  The first significant policy adopted was the 1998 Newcomer 
Integration Law (Wet Inburgering Niewkomers) (“WIN”).233  The goal 
of this law was facilitating “migrants’ participation in mainstream 
institutions . . . and ‘autonomy,’ to be achieved through Dutch 
language acquisition and labour-market integration.”234  This goal was 
to be achieved by requiring most third-country nationals seeking 
prolonged residence in the Netherlands to take a yearlong civic 
integration course.235  The course included “600 hours of Dutch 
language instruction, civic education, and preparation for the labour 
market.”236 
The WIN has been revised a number of times since 1998.  Today 
two categories of migrants are required to pass a civic integration exam 
as a condition for prolonged residence in the Netherlands.237  The first 
category is most third-country nationals entering the Netherlands who 
intend to reside for a prolonged period of time.238  The second category 
228. Id. 
229. See id. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at, 6. For example, TCNs’ unemployment rates were three to 5.4 times higher
than the rates for Dutch citizens between 1999 and 2007. 
232. Id. at 6.
233. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 6.
234.  Id. 
235.  Id. 
236.  Id. 
237. When the WIN was first adopted most third-country nationals seeking prolonged
residence in the Netherlands had to take a yearlong civic integration course.  The course 
includes “600 hours of Dutch language instruction, civic education, and preparation for the 
labour market.”  Id. 
238. INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, Laws for Legal Immigration in the 27 EU Member
States 404-05, (2009), https://perma.cc/7GZ9-VCK4 [hereinafter Laws for Legal 
Immigration].  The integration requirement is a requirement for obtaining a residence visa. 
Id. at 404.  Third-country nationals from developed OECD countries like the United States, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan are exempt from this civic integration 
requirement pursuant to bilateral treaties.  Id. at 6, n.5. 
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is most third-country nationals residing in the Netherlands seeking 
permanent residence.239  Those in the first category must pass the civic 
integration exam before they are issued a visa to travel to the 
Netherlands.240  The exam is oral and it is taken at the Dutch embassy 
in their country of residence.241  Applicants have their Dutch language 
skills and knowledge about the Netherlands tested.242  For example, 
applicants can be asked about “Dutch lifestyle, geography, transport, 
history, constitution, democracy, legislation, Dutch language and the 
importance of learning it, parenting, education, healthcare, work and 
income.”243  Those in the second category do not have to take the civic 
integration test if they passed it to enter the Netherlands initially. 
Permanent residence permits are only available to lawfully present 
migrants who have resided in the Netherlands for five years.244 
The Netherlands has conditioned many TCNs’ access to long-term 
residence status on national cultural belonging.  This has been an 
intentional move to ensure that TCNs who will become long-term, if 
not life-long, residents in the Netherlands speak Dutch, have specific 
knowledge about the Netherlands, and are familiar with Dutch 
values.245  By 2004, the purpose of the WIN was described as 
“instilling dominant Dutch ‘values and norms.’ ” 246  Civic integration 
requirements were adopted in an attempt to address immigrant 
integration failures and it was migrants from Morocco and Turkey that 
were driving these concerns.247 
239. Civic Integration, IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION SERV., https://perma.cc/XV3H-
4HKJ [hereinafter Civic Integration].  Third-country nationals from developed OECD 
countries like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan are exempt 
from this civic integration requirement as well pursuant to bilateral treaties.  Joppke, Beyond 
National Models, supra note 217, at 6, n.5. 
240. International Organization for Migration at 404-05.
241. Laws for Legal Immigration, supra note 238; Joppke, Beyond National Models,
supra note 217, at 7-8. 
242. Laws for Legal Immigration, supra note 238, at 405.
243. Id. at 405.
244. Id. at 406.  Others are exempt as well.  For example, various categories of workers
are not required to obtain the visa for which passing the civic integration test is a 
requirement.  Id. at 406; Civic Integration, supra note 239.  For example, those with a 
European Blue Card from another E.U. Member State are not required to apply for the 
residence visa.  Civic Integration, supra note 239. 
245. See Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 6-7; Laws for Legal
Immigration, supra note 238, at 405. 
246. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 7 (internal quotation marks
omitted). 
247. Yet pursuant to a national court decision, migrants from Turkey are not subject to
the civic integration requirements for initial entry, only when seeking a permanent residence 
permit.  Bonjour, supra note 200, at 207, 214; Civic Integration, supra note 239.  Turkey 
has an association agreement with the European Union and based on European Court of 
Justice jurisprudence regarding that agreement a Dutch national court held that integration 
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As outlined in Part III, it is third-country nationals with long-term 
residence status that have citizenship rights that most closely resemble 
those of national citizens.  Requiring civic integration in the form of 
language skills and knowledge of Dutch culture and values for long-
term residence status conditions citizenship rights on national cultural 
belonging. 
2. France
France followed the Netherlands’ approach of conditioning TCNs’
long-term residence status on civic integration.  France was a likely 
adopter of civic integration requirements because such requirements fit 
with the French approach to national membership—republican 
assimilation.248  This approach to immigration integration “requires a 
high degree of assimilation in the public sphere.”249 
As in the Netherlands, concerns about immigrant integration gave 
rise to conditioning residence permits on the acquisition of French 
language skills and knowledge about French values.  In 2003, the 
government began requiring all adult TCNs, and TCNs over the age of 
sixteen, intending to settle in France to enter into an integration and 
welcome contract.250  The integration and welcome contract begins by 
describing France as a democracy, a country of rights and duties, a 
secular country, and a country of equality.251  The discussion on 
equality focuses exclusively on gender equality.252  Other aspects of 
equality such as racial, ethnic, nationality, gender identity, and sexual 
orientation are not mentioned in this discussion of equality as a 
national value.253  The contract also explains that knowledge of the 
requirements for family migration were incompatible with the EU-Turkey Association 
Agreement.  Bonjour, supra note 200, at 214.  The court’s decision was limited to pre-
departure integration requirements for family migration by TCNs.  
248. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 9.
249. KOOPMANS, ET. AL., supra note 202, at 8.
250. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 11; Laws for Legal
Immigration, supra note 238, at 267. 
251. Welcome to France, MINISTRY FOR EMP., SOC. COHESION, AND HOUSING & NAT’L 
AGENCY FOR THE WELCOME OF FOREIGNERS AND MIGRATIONS (2007), 
https://perma.cc/DJK7-Q86A [hereinafter French Integration Contract]. 
252. Id. 
253. The section on equality states,
Equality between men and women is a fundamental principal of French society. Women 
have the same rights and the same duties as men. Parents are jointly responsible for their 
children. This principle is applied to all, French people and foreigners alike. Women are not 
subject either to the authority of their husband or to that of their father or brother, for 
example in terms of work, going out or opening a bank account. Forced marriages and 
polygamy are forbidden, while the integrity of the body is protected by law.  
Id. 
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French language is critical for national unity.254  French language skills 
are described as “essential to your integration, and will encourage 
contact with the entire population.”255 
The integration and welcome contract not only describes French 
society and values, it also creates obligations for the state and the 
TCNs.  TCNs are required to participate in a day of civic training that 
addresses “the fundamental rights principles and values of the 
Republic, as well as the institutions of France,”256 to attend French 
language classes (if required), to pass a French language exam, and to 
attend interviews to monitor progress on fulfilling the contractual 
obligations.257  These requirements must be satisfied within the first 
year of residence or the noncitizens’ residence permit will not be 
renewed.258  Additionally, TCNs seeking a long-term residence permit, 
which is valid for ten years and has a right of automatic renewal, must 
satisfy the requirements of the integration and welcome contract.259 
For TCNs who are seeking to migrate to France as the spouse, 
partner, or child of a French citizen or noncitizen with the right to 
family reunification, the integration evaluation must be completed 
before being granted permission to enter France.  Individuals must 
demonstrate a basic level of French language skills and knowledge of 
“the values of the Republic” before being admitted to France.260  
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
256. During civic training program TCNs watch a film entitled, “Vivre Ensemble, En
France,” (“Living Together, in France”).  The French agency responsible for immigrant 
integration describes the dual purposes of the film as  
present[ing] to newcomers the fundamental values of the French Republic as well as each 
citizen’s rights and duties (gender equality, secularism, human dignity and human rights). 
Then, to provide information about the CAI and explain the duty of each migrant to respect 
it in order to have their resident permit issued or renewed. 
Living Together in France, L’OFFICE FRANCAIS DE L’IMMIGRATION ET DE 
L’INTEGRATION (last visited Aug. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/N7Y2-MQ6P. 
257. French Integration Contract, supra note 251. 
258. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 11; Laws for Legal
Immigration, supra note 238, at 265, 267.  
259. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 11; Laws for Legal
Immigration, supra note 238, at 268. 
260.  Laws for Legal Immigration, supra note 238, at 268.; Sara Wallace Goodman,
Controlling Immigration through Language and Country Knowledge Requirements, 34 W. 
EUROPEAN POLITICS 235, 238-39 (2011) [hereinafter Controlling Immigration through 
Language and Country].  The French ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Development explains,  
The third-country spouse of a French national must apply for a long-stay visa from the 
relevant consular office. He/she will be required to provide documentary evidence of the 
French nationality of his/her spouse, of his/her marital status, and proof of an adequate 
knowledge of French or of having followed the required French language training, in 
countries where the OFII has put in place the procedure for assessing knowledge of French 
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France offers courses outside of France that teach French language and 
values for free to prepare TCNs spouses, partners, and children to pass 
the required test.261 
France, like the Netherlands, has conditioned access to the long-
term residence permit on national cultural belonging.  This is important 
because long-term residence status is the status that gives TCNs 
citizenship rights that approximate those of EU citizens.  Before a TCN 
can access freedom of movement, robust protection against 
deportation, or equal access to employment, the individual must 
demonstrate French language proficiency and be educated regarding 
French values.262 
3. Germany
Until 2000 Germany was the quintessential example of citizenship
acquisition via the jus sanguinis principle.263  Citizenship was only 
available to those with German parents and those of German descent.264  
These citizenship acquisition rules excluded the large number of 
immigrants that arrived in Germany post-World War II.265  The 
children of these immigrants who were born in Germany were treated 
as immigrants.266  They were able to obtain permanent residence status, 
but not citizenship.267  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Germany 
experienced the same push as the Netherlands and France to better 
incorporate long-term resident TCNs.  TCNs in Germany, like those in 
the Netherlands and France, had lower levels of educational attainment 
and higher unemployment rates than German citizens.268  Like these 
and the values of the Republic. 
FAQ – Visas, FRENCH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INT’L DEV. , (2016), 
https://perma.cc/FCM6-CKFE. 
261.  Bonjour, supra note 200.
262. A significant number of TCNs seeking to settle in France are from Francophone
countries such that French language skills are not lacking.  For example, when the 
integration and welcome contract requirement was first adopted it was predicted that only 
one-third of the TCNs subject to the contract would be required to enroll in French language 
courses.  Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 9. 
263. Gregory Baldi & Sara Wallace Goodman, Migrants into Members: Social rights,
Civic Requirements, and Citizenship in Western Europe, W. EUR. POL. 1156 (May 22, 
2015), http://faculty.sites.uci.edu/sgoodman/files/2011/03/Baldi-and-
Goodman_WEP_2015.pdf. 
264. BRUBAKER, supra note 68; Baldi & Goodman, supra note 263, at 1156. 
265. While economic migration largely ended after the 1973-74 oil crisis due to a
government moratorium, asylum seekers and family reunification migrants continued to 
arrive.  Id. at 1156. 
266. Id. at 1156-57.
267. Id.
268. German Education Policy and the Challenge of Migration, EUR. COMMISSION 7
(2007), http://emilie.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/wp3-germany-formatted.pdf; 
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countries, Germany implemented integration requirements for migrants 
seeking long-term residence.  Germany had a long-term pre-existing 
integration program for integrating ethnic German migrants.  The 
measures adopted to assist the integration of non-ethnic German TCNs 
essentially extended the existing program to new migrants.269 
German law requires migrants seeking permanent residence270 in 
Germany to demonstrate German-language skills and to be familiar 
with the German legal system, culture, and history.271  Spouses of 
German citizens and foreigners with the right to family reunification 
are required to demonstrate basic German-language skills before being 
granted a visa to travel to Germany.272  These spouses cannot move to 
Germany until they can demonstrate basic German-language skills. 
This is part of the growing trend of pre-departure integration 
requirements.  The Federal Office of Migration and Refugees justifies 
these requirements in stating that “[l]anguage skills are an elementary 
requirement to ensure successful integration” and that Germany 
“wishes to ensure that these people can participate in society from the 
outset.”273 
All other migrants seeking permanent residence must participate 
in an integration course and pass a language and culture test if they 
“are unable to communicate at least at a basic level in the German 
language.”274  The integration course consists of approximately 600 
hours of German language instruction and 30 hours of civics 
International Migration Database, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (last visited 
Aug. 4, 2016), https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG. 
269. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 12.  Joppke explains that
[s]ince the 1990s Germany has offered language courses to would-be ethnic migrants in
Eastern Europe and Russia, which prepared them for a ‘status test’ that had to be passed
before they were entitled to immigrate to Germany, and after arrival there was additional
state-funded language instruction and civic orientation for a period of six months.
270. Pursuant to the Residence Act permanent residence is “generally to be assumed if
the foreigner receives a residence permit of at least one year’s duration or has held a 
residence permit for more than 18 months, unless the stay is of a temporary nature.”  Act on 
the Residence, Economic Activity and Integration of Foreigners in the Federal Territory, 
GERMAN FED. MINISTRY OF JUST. AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, art. 44(1) (2015), 
https://perma.cc/WQG7-KJ7F [hereinafter German Residence Act]. 
271. Id. at art. 43(2).
272. Id. at art. 44a(1); Subsequent Entry of Spouses, FED. OFFICE OF MIGRATION &
REFUGEES, (Jun. 14, 2013), https://perma.cc/U9NE-ZXL5 [hereinafter Subsequent Entry]. 
The Residence Act requires that these individuals “possess a sufficient command of the 
German language at the time of issuance of a residence title.”  German Residence Act, supra 
note 243, at 44a(1). Demonstrating German-language skills at the A1 level pursuant to the 
Common European Framework of Reference for Languages, a beginner basic user, is 
sufficient.  German Residence Act, supra note 270, at 44a(1). 
273. Subsequent Entry, supra note 272.
274. German Residence Act, supra note 270, at art. 44a(1).
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instruction.275  Participants are required to demonstrate German 
language skills at the B1 level276 and pass the “Life in Germany” 
test.277  If an individual does not satisfy these requirements they run the 
risk that their residence permit will not be extended.278  Some residence 
permits, however, are available as of right and must be extended even 
if the integration requirements are not satisfied.  For example, migrants 
present based on a right to family reunification pursuant to German 
constitutional law cannot have a residence permit extension denied for 
failing to satisfy the integration requirements.279 
One final group of migrants are subject to integration 
requirements.  Migrants seeking a permanent residence permit or an 
EU long-term residence permit are required to demonstrate “sufficient 
command of the German language,” and “possess [] a basic knowledge 
of the legal and social system and the way of life in the federal 
territory.”280  These requirements are deemed satisfied once an 
individual completes the integration course, demonstrates German-
language skills at the B1 level and passes the “Life in Germany” 
exam.281 
In order to obtain a permanent residence permit or an EU long-
term residence permit a TCN must have had a residence permit in 
Germany for five years.  Since access to not only a permanent 
residence permit, but also a basic residence permit, requires German-
language skills and knowledge about German legal system, culture, and 
history, national cultural belonging is a requirement for gaining the 
legal status that gives rise to important citizenship rights in Germany. 
The use of pre-arrival integration requirements for spouses of German 
citizens and noncitizens entitled to family reunification more 
275. Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 12; Baldi & Goodman, supra
note 263. 
276. B1 represents an independent user with intermediate skills pursuant to the Common
European Framework of Reference for Languages. 
277. See Baldi & Goodman, supra note 263, at 1158. 
278. German Residence Act, supra note 270, at art. 8(3).  Residence permits in Germany
are typically granted for no longer than one year and then must be extended. 
279. Id. at art. 8(3); Joppke, Beyond National Models, supra note 217, at 13-14.
Migrants whose right to residence is statutory rather than constitutional can be denied an 
extension  
unless the foreigner furnishes evidence that he or she has achieved integration into the 
community and society by other means. In reaching a decision on this matter, due 
consideration shall be given to the duration of lawful stay, the foreigner’s legitimate ties to 
the federal territory and consequences of the termination of residence for dependents of the 
foreigner who are lawfully resident in the federal territory. 
German Residence Act, supra note 270, at art. 8(3). 
280. German Residence Act, supra note 270, at 9(2)(7-8). 
281. See Baldi & Goodman, supra note 263, at 1158. 
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significantly limits TCNs access to citizenship rights.  These 
individuals are unable to access German territory until they can 
demonstrate national cultural belonging.  Political scientist Sarah 
Wallace Goodman explains that “[p]re-entry integration requirements 
mandate a degree of integration into the state while the applicant is 
physically and conceptually—vis-a-vis legal status—outside the 
state.”282 
Contrary to the claim of postnational citizenship scholars, TCNs’ 
access to the citizenship rights critical for immigrant incorporation 
continue to be dependent upon their ability to demonstrate national 
cultural belonging.  Absolute protection for these rights is exclusively 
available to citizens, but these rights are robustly protected for TCNs 
with long-term residence status.  Yet, access to long-term residence 
status is substantively similar to access to citizenship status because 
both require demonstration of national cultural belonging.  As a 
broader range of citizenship rights have been made available to third-
country nationals, EU member states are increasingly conditioning 
access to those rights on TCNs having local language skills, being 
familiar with country-specific knowledge, and sharing national values. 
The discussion of The Netherlands, France, and Germany highlights 
how these requirements are conditioning long-term residence status on 
national cultural belonging. 
C. Using Civic Integration to Identify Members
Critical rights for immigrant integration include immigration-
related rights, economic activity rights, and political participation 
rights.  The most robust version of these rights are reserved for 
individuals who are full members of the polity.  The analysis offered in 
this article demonstrates that national cultural belonging continues to 
be a basis for measuring membership.  While citizenship scholars and 
EU officials seek to ensure that long-term resident TCNs have access 
to citizenship rights that will facilitate their integration, disagreement 
remains regarding the basis upon which certain rights should be 
available to noncitizens.  Early EU efforts suggested that long-term 
lawful residence should be sufficient for granting robust resident and 
membership rights.  This suggested that long-term residence was a 
basis for identifying members.  Yet, EU member states began to 
282. Controlling Immigration, supra note 260, at 237.  Goodman views these
requirements as a new form of immigration restriction.  Id. (“pre-entry integration 
requirements are a direct attempt to regulate immigrant intake through criteria of national 
membership.”). 
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conclude that long-term residence in the country did not give rise to the 
types of connections deemed desirable for membership.  It is possible 
that EU officials assumed that the desirable cultural connections would 
exist by virtue of long-term residence, but EU member states are 
increasingly rejecting this assumption.  Not only are EU member states 
testing noncitizens’ cultural belonging after long-term residence, they 
are also denying entry to individuals who are unable to demonstrate 
successful progress toward national cultural belonging.  These 
developments suggest that despite claims made by postnational 
citizenship scholars, national cultural belonging remains an important 
condition for obtaining rights that facilitate integration.  Noncitizens’ 
ability to fully develop their human capital and put it to its best use 
depends on their ability to demonstrate civic integration.  Whether this 
is a legitimate or desirable approach to citizenship rights will be 
addressed in future work.  This article demonstrates that in practice we 
are far from a world in which decisions about who gets citizenship 
rights are divorced from “territorialized notions of cultural 
belonging.”283 
CONCLUSION 
The introduction posed a number of questions about the ability of 
a State to limit the rights of noncitizens or to condition the availability 
of rights on an individual’s ability to speak English or know how to 
enroll their child in elementary school. Noncitizens have gained an 
increasing number of citizenship rights in the post-World War II era, 
but the analysis offered in this article illustrates the limited nature of 
noncitizens’ rights in the areas most important for incorporation. 
 Postnational citizenship scholars noticed these developments and 
declared that a new approach to citizenship rights existed in which such 
rights are available “based on universal personhood rather than national 
belonging.”284  The postnational citizenship model accurately identifies 
the unbundling of citizenship rights and decoupling of these rights from 
citizenship status, but the account is incomplete.  The allocation of 
rights based on personhood rather than national belonging only 
describes human rights.  The two other categories of citizenship 
rights—resident rights and membership rights—continue to be 
allocated based on lawful residence and national cultural belonging. 
The increasing use of civic integration requirements demonstrates EU 
member states’ unease with granting robust membership rights to 
283. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 3.
284. SOYSAL, supra note 6, at 1. 
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individuals who are unable to demonstrate language skills, country 
knowledge, and national values.  Robust protection of immigration-
related rights, political rights, and economic rights is contingent on 
individuals demonstrating national cultural belonging—a commitment 
to the values, norms, and practices of the state.  Individuals with 
citizenship status are presumed to have the requisite level of national 
cultural belonging, but noncitizens increasingly have the opportunity to 
demonstrate national cultural belonging outside of the naturalization 
context.  A growing number of EU member states are conditioning 
admission and long-term residence status on civic integration, which 
measure national cultural belonging.  These developments reveal the 
incompleteness of the postnational citizenship model as a strategy for 
limiting noncitizens’ vulnerability. 
The analysis offered in this article illustrates noncitizen’s 
vulnerability to executive order travel bans in the United States.  While 
personhood often effectively protects noncitizens within the borders of 
their states of residence, it rarely provides protection at the border. 
Access to legal rights not only determines the scope of government 
authority over immigrants, it enables immigrants to put their individual 
human capital—language skills, education, and job skills—to its best 
use.  Returning to the questions asked in the introduction, noncitizen 
access to human rights does little to limit the government’s authority to 
suspend the entry of noncitizens or deport unauthorized migrants. 
Immigration-related rights are extremely robust membership rights, 
limited resident rights, and nonexistent as human rights. An accurate 
understanding of noncitizens’ citizenship rights is necessary to 
determine which rights are outstanding, whether or not such rights alter 
an immigrant’s context of reception, and whether or not such rights 
should be available based on personhood, lawful residence, or 
membership.  This article offers the first step of this analysis by 
outlining which rights are outstanding, and offering initial thoughts on 
the impact that limited access to immigration-related rights, economic 
activity rights, and political participation rights has on immigrants’ 
integration patterns.  Future projects will more fully explore this issue 
and explore whether or not immigration-related rights, economic 
activity rights, and political participation rights must be membership 
rights.  The analysis presented in this article demonstrates that the 
continued conditioning of citizenship rights on national cultural 
belonging limits noncitizens’ access to the rights that enable them to 
fully develop and utilize their human capital, which leaves them 
vulnerable. 
